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P R E F A C E 
The object of t h i s work i s to place before the reader , 
the v i t a l connection and in te rac t ion between the p o l i t i c a l 
developments of France and North India as well as the response 
of the B r i t i s h East India adminis t ra t ion during 1789 to 1815. 
lEhroughout the period, the fa te of North India depended upon 
the changing circumstances in France; a f a c t , which has not 
a t t r ac ted adequate a t t e n t i o n of wr i t e r s on Indian History. 
The Indian po l icy , did not r e ly single-handedly upon the native 
Indian s i t ua t ion . By Inevi table force of circumstances, India 
was drawn into the vortex of European p o l i t i c s . French 
antagonism of Br i t a in deeply influenced the pol icy of India 
House. Malleson had long back discussed some of these developments 
in h i s work- F ina l French £.trugp;le3 in India and on the Indian 
Seas. Subsequently S.P. Sen has made valuable contr ibut ion in 
h i s work e n t i t l e d : The French in India . Most of the s tudies have 
general ly concentrated on the French and the Carna t i cwars . 
The exp lo i t s and services of the French adventurers in North 
Indian s t a te and the percept ion of the French th r ea t to India 
by the Br i t i sh East India Company adminis t ra tors have not been 
adequately dea l t with. The present study i s an attempt to f i l l 
in t h i s gap. I have made use of both the B r i t i s h and French 
records avai lable in India. 
I would l ike to express my sense of indebtedness to 
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I F T R 0 I) T^ c T I 0 N 
The way India was subju^^ated by t h e Br i t i sh has 
few p a r a l l e l s in h i s to ry . In India the f i r s t contenders 
were the Portuguese, followed by the Dutch and the French. 
Prance 's i n t e r e s t , in I n d i a , s t a r t e d l a t e in the seventeenth 
century. l ike other Europeans, they too , were a t t rac ted by 
the wealth of India. 
In 1600, the English East India Company was granted 
the Royal Charter. Strange i t may anpear, the company was 
founded "at a meeting of London merchants in Lord Mayor's 
1 par lour , to consider the unchr is t ian pr ice of pepper". 
Yet, the Royal Charter granted them, 'monopoly of commerce 
in eas tern w a t e r s ' . In 1602, the United East India Company 
of the Netherlands was granted the Charter. They were given 
powers to make t r e a t i e s , acquire t e r r i t o r i e s and build 
f o r t r e s s e s . I t was also used as an instrument of war and 
conquest of overseas t e r r i t o r i e s . 
The French so ld ie r s of fortune were followed by great 
t r a v e l l e r s l ike Tavernier and Bernier. I t was through t h e i r 
wr i t ings tha t the royal court at Ver sa i l l e s came to know 
about the ?.1ughals of India a t Delhi and Agra. Colbert, the 
i n f l u e n t i a l minister of Louis XIV guided the economic l i f e 
1. Southgate, G.W. , The Br i t i sh Emnire and Commonv/ealth. Dent, 
1953, p. 174. ' 
2 
of France. He was acqufiinted with, these travellers and had 
even supported them. He even encouraged the founding of the 
'Compagnie des Indes Orientalcs'in 1644. It vmo founded 
and financed by the state. Hereafter, French sailors, soldiers, 
financiers, adventurers and administrators came to India; they 
were all soldiers of fortune, lured by India's wealth. 
The first French factory in India was established at 
Surat in I668. Therefore, a factory v/as built at Masulipatnam 
in I669. In 1673, the foundations of Pondicherry were laid 
down by Francois Martin and Be Hanger de Lespinay. Soon, 
it developed into an important place. 
French interest in the north India began in 1674. The 
factory at Chandernagore was built in 1690-92. The Dutch and 
the English were their strongest rivals. Consequently, they 
could not enlarge their interests. The French East India 
Company was even short of resources. Till 1742, its objrctives 
remained mainly commercial gain. A change in its policy came 
when Dupleix came to India as the governor of Pondicherry. 
Eighteenth century India saw the disintegration of the 
Mughal empire. Dupleix saw an opportunity for France to lay 
the foundations of a French empire. He began to exploit the 
circumstances, took part in local disputes between the two 
Indian states. He offered supoort of his troops to these 
states who sought his help. Consequently he spread the 
influence of the French East India Company over a vast region 
in the South India. 
3 
These activities of Dupleix were not viewed with 
favour by the English East India Company, thus began the 
phase of intense rivalry between the British and the French 
adventurers in India. Clive was quick to learn from the 
methods of Dupleix and pursued them more vigourously. He 
also took advantage of the situation to exploit the contending 
states. These two companies recruited Indian Soldiers in 
the army and the services of such foreign trained soldiers 
were in great demand from the Indian States. Both the 
English and French exploited this situation, in turn their 
own rivalry got intensified leading to an armed conflict. 
The English were alarmed by the growing influence of 
the French. Clive was an agent of the rising British middle 
class, therefore, he received full support from his home 
country whereas Dupleix and his colleagues received no such 
support frorathdr country. The English, finally succeeded in 
crushing the French ambition of a French empire in India. 
Hereafter the French adventurers set out for greener 
pastuers in the service of Indian rulers who sought their 
help in raising a European trained army with modern weapons. 
Several of the French soldiers, adventurers and administrators 
got lucrative employment in the north Indian States. A recent 
work argues that the Indian rulers vied with one another to 
have French men in their service. The present study seeks 
to examine their activities and the response of the English 
East India Company rulers, towards them. 
1. Rose Vincent (ed.), The French in India, 199O p. 97. 
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French Revolution of 1789 wns a world shaking event, 
it also affected Chandernagore, the principal French settlement 
in north India. The Kevolutionary slogans of "Equality, 
Liberty and Fraternity", inspired the people to rise against 
the autocratic functioning of their governor. The administr-
ation of Chandernagore was notorious for its arhitrja-y 
character. In ttieir revolutionary zeal, the people of 
Chandernagore set up a G-eneral Assembly of Citi?:ens as well 
as a l^ ational Committee to check the power of governor. 
They drafted and adopted a constitution and made the governor 
to function under it and remain royal to it. Eventually, 
the governor had to concede all the demands of the National 
Assembly. 
V^ ith the outbreak of the revolutionary war in Europe, 
Prance entered on a new phase of her history. She was fired 
with a new mission and her sight was fixed on the Continent. 
The magnificent successes of her arms agninst the whole of 
monarchical Europe, gave her a nev/ euphoria which took many 
years to pass off. It was only natural that she readily 
abandonded her overseas possessions in order to concentrate 
all her vigour and strength in the fulfilment of her new 
mission in Eiirope. 
At that time Lord Cornwallis, the Governor General was 
of the view tliat sooner or later India v/ould be drawn into 
the vortex of European disturbances since her destiny had 
5 
been linked with that of England as a r e s u l t of ba t t le of 
Plassey. 
In North India , the Scindhia employed the expert ise of 
Europeans, chief of whom were the French. P i r s t ue Boigne 
and then Perron modernised the army of Scindhia on the 
European model. The zenith of 5'rench adventurism in India 
reached during the Governor-Generalship of Sir -John Shore 
who remained non- in tervent ionis t as England was involved in 
s t r i f e with the Revolutionary France in Europe. 
Sir John Shore's succerfior Lord v/el lesley, assumed 
chjirge in 1798. Welles ley 's Governor-Generalship synchronised 
with a c r i t i c a l phase of England's struggle in Europe against 
the Napoleonic France. 
Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. This expedition was 
looked upon as a t h rea t to t h e Br i t i sh power in India. I t 
kept the Br i t i sh adminis t ra t ion in India on the red a l e r t . 
Under these circumstances Lord v/ellesley inaugrated h i s 
Subsidiary Alliances to expel the French employed in pr incely 
s t a t e s . 
He decided tha t a l l t r a ce s of French influence must be 
swept aside from India in order to allow no foothold to a 
French invading army. Lord '.Vellesley's p r inc ipa l p o l i t i c a l 
aim was the des t ruc t ion of the imaginary French State nov/ 
formed on the bnnlcs of the Jumna under the vice royal ty of 
Perron. 
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He was of the view tha t the exclusion of the French 
would lead to the e leva t ion of the East India Company to the 
pos i t ion of a Paramount Power in India. 
The conf l ic t ing and v a c i l l a t i n g p o l i c i e s of the Indian 
Sta tes did not help to e s t ab l i sh p o l i t i c a l s tahil i ty in India , 
yet the French with the help of bcindhia, in the face of 
declining Mughal Empire could have provided a r a l ly ing point 
in the north India to drive away the B r i t i s h . The English 
policy was to stave off any such attempt. The French menace 
was sought to be eliminated through the establishment of 
a comprehensive system of a l l i a n c e s and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t ions 
with native s t a t e s . 
The Treaty of Amiens in 1802, es tabl ished peace 
temporarily and there was an uneasy calm. Baji Rao's 
acceptance of B r i t i s h protect ion caused anger and dismay 
to Ecindhia. I t was realif.ed by Scindhia tha t he had to 
face the Br i t i sh power after the Treaty of Basse in which 
provided for Br i t i sh a r b i t r a t i o n betv/een the Peshwa and 
the other Indian powert^. As Scindhia had, Perron t ra ined 
French b a t t a l i o n s and was capjibie of offering a ser ious 
opposit ion to the East India Company in North India, Lord 
Wellesley decided to ann ih i la te the Frencn influence at 
Scindhia 's court . The objects of 'Yellesley v/ere the 
des t ruct ion of Perron 's ir:fluence and establishment of 
Br i t i sh control over the Delhi-Agra region. He defined 
7 
a well kni t north India under the Rri t ieh porninountcy 
eliminfiting the French thrc^at forever. 
Vi'ellesley's spectacular success was achieved as much 
by clever diplomacy, as by the sheer weight of arras. The 
deser t ion of Bcindhia's French Commander Perron was largely 
due to the diplomatic manoeuvers of the B r i t i s h . The Bri t i sh 
v ic tory over the Scindhia proved tha t the replacement of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l Maratha system of war by the a l i en French 
system could not bring v i c to ry . By neglecting the cavalry 
and re ly ing upon the i l l d i sc ip l ined and i l l -equipped infantry 
which was led by undependable French o f f i c e r s , for Scindhia 
the d i s a s t e r was inev i t ab le . The conduct of Perron gave a 
rude j o l t to the French m i l i t a r y pres t ige in India. At l a s t 
Scindhia had to accept the Subsidiary Al l iance . By breaking 
the power of Scindhia and by el iminating the French menace 
along the banks of Jumna, Lord V/ellesley converted the 
Br i t i sh Empire in India in to the Br i t i sh Empire of India. 
In Europe the French was had broken out in to fresh 
fury af ter the f a i l u r e of Treaty of Amiens. At t h i s juncture 
the India House did not want more wars in India as that v/ould 
have involved i t too much away rroin i t s shores. 
Napoleon was raarchin,": from vic tory to victory on the 
Continent. He also forged an a l l iance with the Czar known 
as Treaty of T i l s i t , aimed at sending out a Franco-Russian 
expedition to India via land route, This alarmed Lord Minto, 
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the Governor-General in India . He entered into t r e a t i e s 
with the Punjab and Sirdh to counteract Napoleonic project 
of a Pranco-ii^ussian expedit ion to India through th^-se two 
border s t a t e s . 
But by 1809 Kapoloon deeply f^ ot bof;ged down in the 
Peninsular War. He had to abandon h i s scheme to drive away 
xhe Br i t i sh from India . He met a d i sa s t e r in Hussia in 1812. 
These developments f a c i l i t a t e d the complete exoulsion of the 
French threa t from India foi-ever. 
At the Corigress of Vienna in 1815, the French recognized 
for the f i r s t t ime, T3ritish sovereignty over the Br i t i sh 
possession in India , and also agreed not to maintain troops 
and erect any fo r t r e s se s in India, The f i na l collapse of the 
French i n t e r e s t in India great ly f a c i l i t a t e d the ult imate 
conquest of India. 
A study of t h i s kind i;; hampered by the non-avai lab i l i ty 
of French records of the period under study in India. They 
have been t ransferred to I''rence from the Pondicherry 
Archives. Under these circumstances, I have quoted the 
sources from the works of c.P. Sen. 
Chapter i g 
The Revolutionary Disturbances a t Chandcrnapjore 
1 
Chandernagore was ret un in I69O but it was in decay, 
as a result of French defeat at the hands of English in 
1760. Its commercial activities were marked by indolerice, 
lacking intiative to safeguard and promote French trade and 
commerce. 
Chandernagore had loft its political significance as 
well as commercial prosperity. In spite of this, Chandernagore 
was the hub of economic activities for the French establishments 
in India, The major portion of revenue came from the sale 
of salt and opium in Bengal whereas the territorial revenue 
2 
contributed only a small part of the total revenue. 
The opium trade in Chandernagore settlement was 
privately owned but Montigny, the Commandant brought it under 
state control. This step registered a profit of 12 to 15 
hundred thousand livres annually. The salt was another 
major commodity for trade. It was purchased on the basis 
of permits by the English in Calcutta at a fixed price of 
Rupees 120 for 100 mounds. These permits brought to 
Chandernagore 7^ deduction for meeting establishment 
charges and for imparting relief to the poor in the various 
settlements. 
1. About the origin of Chandernagore, see S.P. ben* s article 
Farmans „ and Parawans for the Establishment of the French 
in Bengal, Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records, 
1946. 
2. ms. 2542 (P. A.) 
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For Chandern&gore, salt trnde was very significant 
Laternadie descritied it in these words*. 
"the sale of permits of salt was a resource for the 
state, the sale of salt brought an income to private persons 
and in addition the percentage deducted from the total sale 
proceeds, augmented a fund for the relief of the poor". 
We can see how salt brought considerable income to 
Chandernagore, It developed into centre whose commercial 
importance was more than political. 
Montigny's reforms of establishing state monopoly 
over the opium trade and introducing permits for salt, 
proved advantageous to Chandernagore and its prosperity 
increased a great deal. Montigny also curtailed several 
undesirable expenditures which naturally made him unpopular 
and his schemes started drawing finks from all quarters. 
Montigny wrote a note on the improvements in administration, 
tittled as "The present State of the French Settlements in 
Bengal" dated May 29, 1789.'^  
Nevertheless Montigny was criticised by his detractors 
as a dictator: "Whose long residence at the court of 
Marathas, had accustomed him to all the manoeuvres of an 
abject policy and who believed that he could employ the same 
1, Labernadie, La Revolution et les Etabljssments 
Francais dans 1' Inde 1929 p.209. 
2. ms. 2690 (P.A.) 
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1 
methods for the governance of Chandernagore". 
Monti^ n^;^ ^ had been more succeor.f ul at Poona than at 
Chandernagore. He took s t r i c t measurec, v/hich were dis l iked 
by those who had profi ted at the cost of the set t lement. 
Hontigny assumed the powers of the President of the 
t r ibuna l and crushed the power of ordonnateur. He sacked 
the three Assessors of the Tribunal, de Verinnes, Auvernais 
and Tinglet de Neuville and inducted h i s own men in the i r 
2 place. 
Having assured of supremacy over the Tribunal, Montigny 
thereafter dealt witli Richemont, the Procureur, and Kercier 
the Registrar of the court. Both of them were charged with 
grave monetary irregularities and anomalies. Montigny received 
orders from Conway, the Governor-General, to proceed against 
these people and get rid of them. 
However Mercier, managed to decamp from Chandernagore 
with PuDlic funds under his charge. Richemont was charged 
for duplicity in Mercier's escape. He was found guilty and 
suspended from his pont. 
De Bretel, the henchman of Montigny was inducted to 
discharge the duties till the arrival of a permanent incumbent. 
1. Griefs des Citoyens, drawn up by the Revolutionary 
elements at Chandernagore on June 19, 1790, ms. 2712,(P.A.) 
2. Ibid. 
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De Verinnes rc?si^r:ncd on bc l^n,"; chnr.f^ed for grave anomaliee. • 
7e hnve ocen t h a t non i igny ' t ; incisures did shov/ 
improvemente, ye t he became unpopular . He had packed the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n with h io own p a r t i s o n s and lor.t the confidence 
of popu la t ion of Chnnderna^^ore, 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e n . ' l a t i o n s h i p between Chandernagore 
and Pondicherry was ambiguous. This was a cause of g r e a t 
confus ion . In Cact Chandernagore was l e g a l l y under the 
c o n t r o l of Pondicherry but in tlie absence of a powerful 
a u t h o r i t y t h e r e , the Comviandant of Chandernagore had t o 
r e l y on the Governor-General in t h e I s l e of France . 
Montigny was the choice of Conway, the Governor-
Genera l , hence he was d ls l i lced by the Pondicher ry a u t h o r i t i e s 
for accord ing letis r e s p e c t t o them by t h e Chandernagore 
admini s t r a t i on. 
The news of French Revolu t ion i n France was t r a n s m i t t e d 
t o the French s e t t l e m e n t s by niennerue i n 1790. The 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y s lognns of the Franch Ixcvolu t ion-Liber ty , 
E q u a l i t y and F r a t e r h i t y i n s p i r e d t h e people of Chandernagore 
cons ide rab ly . The people i m i t a t e d t h e i r P a r i s i a n b r o t h e r s 
and f;et up a General Assembly of C i t i z e n s and a n a t i o n a l 
Committee to check the po' .ers of Governor. The General 
Asiembly desc r ibed Montigny as an a u t o c r a t who had trampled 
1. I b i d . 
13 
upon the r i g h t s and freedom of the c i t i zens of Chandernagore. 
Riohemont, the procurpur, got s a t i s f i ed with the 
outcome at Pondicherry and returned to Chandernagore, on 
April 28, 1790. But the i s l e of France cent Vil lau des 
Rabines, as the new Procureur annointed by Gonv/ay. 
The myopic a t t i t ude of Montigny aided by the a r r i va l 
of Richeinont, generated a f l a re up among the people of 
2 Chandernagore. Richomont di^=covered that the ariMval of 
Vallau des Kabines threatened hia claim on the office of 
procureur. Richemont was full^'- supported by the Consul 
Superiur in t h i s regard. 
Des Rabines was the r ea l incumbent appointed by the 
Governor-General. Richeraont having seen h i s pos i t ion weakened, 
t r i ed to achieve h i s succci^t; by way of staging popular 
3 
upheaval. 
On April 30, he convened a meeting of his supporters 
calling it the General Assembly of Citizens, The summit was 
attended by 43 citizens. The agenda was an amalgamation of 
Richemont's persoiial complaints and public interests of the 
citizens in general. They had prepared a petition addressed to 
Conseil Provincial urging him to declare the appointment of 
a new Procureur, as null and void. In the meanwhile. 
1. ms. 2716 (P.A. )• 
2. ras. 2722 (P. A. ) 
3. ms. 2735 (P.A.) 
14 
preparat ions were made for a popular upheaval to put 
1 pressure on the a u t h o r i t i e s . Presh appeals were made to 
c i t i z e n s to assemble on May 3- to chalk out a programme 
2 for the welfare and t r a n q u i l i t y of the colony. 
The General Assembly del iberated on the issue on 
3rd May and resolved to pressur ise the Conseil Provincial 
which was scheduled to assemble the same day. De Verinnes 
was elected as President and Tin^^let as Secretary. Both 
of them had been victims of Hontigny's despotic a t t i t u d e . 
Frimont, and other armed personnel took the swearing. 
Richemont had acquired a powerful say in ihe mat ters of 
the Assem.bly. The de l ibe ra t ions s tar ted with the swearing 
in ceremony for "the Nation, the Law and the king". 
Richemont got up to speak about the revolut ion at Pondicherry 
and eas i ly aroused the Passions of the c i t i zens of 
Chandernagore by assuring, that they would obtain from the 
nat ional Assembly in Pa r i s , the en t i r e gain coming from 
the sale of opium and sa l tpe t r e for them without sharing 
i t with the c i t i z e n s of other French set t lements . 
The Conseil Provincial re jected the p e t i t i o n adopted 
on 30th Apri l . This enraged the Assembly which in turn 
pronounced the Conseil dissolved and elected a new one in 
i t s plfice, which r e h a b i l i t a t e d Richemont on h i s old post of 
1. ms. 2738 (P.A.) 
2 . ms. 2739 ('r'. A.) 
3 . ms. 2742 (P. A. ) 
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the Procureur. The c i t i zens , the re upon went on a 
demonstration, seized the Council HOUKC and intitalled a 
new Tribunal . 
Now the Assembly decided to deal with fvloritigny who 
was a despot in the eyes of the c i t i z e n s of Chandernagore. 
Fresh summons were issued to him to appear before the 
Assembly and take an oath of f i d e l i t y to the Nation and 
f^ive recognit ion to the new order. MontigiTy adopted delaying 
t a c t i c s in order to avoid the Assembly. 
He yielded in the pnd h:foie the Assembly and accepted 
i t s four demnnds: Firot to ^Uve recognit ion to the v a l i d i t y 
of the Assembly, second, to give sanction to a l l i t s ac t ions , 
t h i r d , to place the troops under i t s charge and l a s t l y to 
t r e a t the foreign pov /^ers in accordance with i t s wishes. 
Montigny vac i l l a t ed and wanted to buy some time 
by pretending to study the demands. The Assembly refused 
to give him any time. He he.^itatingly accepted a l l the 
demands and took the oath of loyalty to the Nation. He 
was hailed as a p a t r i o t i c leader. The Asi^embly Hall 
echoed with the slogans of "Lon^ T l ive the Nation, long 
l ive nont igiv. " l\\orooYcr, Ilontlgny v/as very t ac t fu l and 
prudont l ike de Fresne, the Governor of Pondicherry. He 
could have maintained a balance between himself and the 
1. Proceedings of the meetings of the General As^ s^embly 
of Cit izens from April 30 to May 14, 1790, ms. ?>698 (P. A.) 
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Assembly, but he had no intention of keeping his words. 
The Assembly met on 9th ITay and directed him to 
inform the foreign powers about the charges in the 
administrative set up of Chandernagore. He vacillated, 
thereupon 11th May, the Committee pressed Montigny to 
recognize the validity of the Assembly and its Committee. 
He declined to do so. Th(^  open perfidy on the part of 
Montigny brought about the convening of the Assembly on 
Hth Hay. In the meanwhile I.lontigny secretly left 
Chandernagore for Chinsurah. The Assembly deliberated 
on his c conduct on Hth L'ay, When informed of his escape, 
the Assembly dismissed Montigny. 
Frimont, the Commander of the troops, viewed that 
it was the charge of the army to maintain order in 
Chandernagore yet he was careful and cautious not to accept 
any functions from the hands of the Assembly. The Committee 
of Assembly took over the functions of the Commandant till 
2 
the arrival of a successor. 
The Revolution seemed victorious but soon there was 
a trouble over its course. I'everal excesses were committed 
against the supporters of Ilontigny. But some peonle felt 
that Ilichemont and liis pp.rtirons v/ere out to befool them. 
1. Extract from the Deliberations of the National Committee 
of Citizens May 9,1790,nis. 2697 (r. A.) 
2. Proceedings of the meetings of the General Assembly of 
citizens, ms. 2698 (?.A. ) 
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The end of May saw thi; rii, '^ht of the ye people to o the r 
s e t t l e m e n t s to escape from the nevvf ty ranny , De Ver innes , 
the P r e s i d e n t of t h e Committee and a member Deonna a f t e r 
havinf=; l a id down t h e i r o f f i c e s , had s h i f t e d t o Serampore. 
Monti^ny a l so reached Terampore from Chinsurab. 
There was c o n s t e r n a t i o n a t Chandernagore t h a t the 
French emigres under the guidance of Hontigny were ha tch ing 
a consp i racy to d ismant le the new regime i n the French 
se t t l emen t by f o r c e . There was a s u b s t a n t i a l t r u t h in the 
a l l e g a t i o n . Montign^y vv.-is working in t h a t d i r t^c t ion and 
had been assured he lp in t h i s regard by the B r i t i s h i n 
Ca lcu t t a . Lord Cornvvallis, t he Governor-General had s t a t e d 
c l e a r l y t h a t B r i t i s h Government in I nd i a v/as with PJontigny 
and did no t recognise any one e l s e , as f a r as the French were 
concerned in I n d i a . In the eyes of C o r n w a l l i s , Montigny 
was the so l e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the French n a t i o n in 
2 Bengal. 
The Committee a t Chandernagore took c e r t a i n concrete 
measures to ward off an ntt;nck by Hontigny and h i s cohor t s . 
They r a i s ed n p r o t e c t i v e force oC armed v o l u n t e e r s t o guard 
a g a i n s t impending a t t a c k . The c i t i f . e n s of Chandernagore 
were armed to n r o t e c t themselves . 
1. L e t t e r from the C i t i z e n s ' Committee t o Friraont , 
June 23 , 1790, ms. 2699 (P. A.) 
2 . Labernadie , o p . c i t . pp. 224-25 
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The situation took n oharp turn when Primont along 
with his troops on 24th June, shifted to Goretty, the 
residential establishment of the Commandant. He took this 
drastic action over the arming of all the citizens without 
his permission. He had nothing to do with the plans of 
Montigny. Kor did he comply with the order of the Committee 
ordering him to report at Chandernagore. 
During his stay at Serampore, Montigny had communicated 
with de Presne, the Governor of Pondicherry and told him 
about the incidents at Chandernagore and blamed the 
Pondicherry Government for the encouragement given to 
2 Richemont. On the other hand the Assembly andthe Committee 
at Chandernagore has also apprised the Pondicherry Government 
about the developments and sought an acsurance from them. 
They also sought protection for their actions and demanded 
3 
a new commandant. 
Under these circumstances it was clear that peace and 
order v/ould be established only when Montigny was deprived 
of the office, held by him. The Citizens of Chandernagore 
were determined to keep Montigny at bay and would not 
allow him to come back and continue his dictatorial methods. 
The determination and strength of their ideas was 
1. ms. 2699 (P.A.) 
2 . L e t t e r s dated May 27 ^ August 24 , 1790,ms. 2702,2738. 
3 . L e t t e r s dated May 29 , June 19, June 29 , Ju ly 1, Ju ly 7 , 
September 6 ,1790 , ms. 2703,2712,2723,2727,2731,2739,(P.A.) 
4 . ms. 2731 (P.A.) 
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reflected in their letter addresGed to the Committee of 
citizens at Pondicherry on 29th May. It resolved: 
"Whatever may happen we would ratht^ r perish than return to 
1 
the chains of despotism. Prance will avenge our death". 
It appears that the ominous features of the 
revolution at Chandernngore could hnve been obliterated if 
Montigny had been divested of his office by the Pondicherry 
Government soon after his flight from Chandernagore. But 
Conway, the Government General turned his back on the 
grievances of the citizens of Chandernagore, because 
Montigny was his protege. It was not till July that Conway 
2 decided to abandon his favourite under pressure. 
Montigny tried his luck by in.stalling himself on 
30th July at Gorctty which was nearer to Chandernagore. 
He decided to use it as a base and teach his rivals, at 
Chandernagore a lesson. He was emboldened after the 
withdrawal of Primont to Goretty. He had recruited armed ' 
constabulary and some cannons from the East India Company. 
But Primont did not join Montigy and remained aloof 
from his project to dismantle the regime at Chandernagore. 
In order to put more pressure, Montigny decided to give a 
rude jolt to the new admini ttratlon at Chnndernagore 
1. ms. 2703 (P.A.) 
2. ms. 2736 (P.A.) 
3. ms. 2737 (P.A.) 
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economical ly . The t r a d e and commerce i n s a l t was on d i r e c t 
payment betweer. the Ca l cu t t a Govi'rnment, and the Commandant 
of Chtindernagore. He was bent upon d i s r u p t i n g the t r ade 
hoping thus t o s h a t t e r the economy of Chandernagore r t l e a s t 
t empora r i l y . 
The Committee a t Chandernagore was in commotion on 
hav ing l e a r n t about the ues igns of Montigny. But soon the 
scena r io changed d r a m a t i c a l l y . Conv/ay sacked Ivlontigny under 
p r e s s u r e . The news of the d i s m i s s a l of I 'ont igny de l igh ted 
the c i t i z e n s a t Chandernagore. The town witnerjsed an 
2 
unprecetiented r e j o i c i n g and c e l e b r a t i o n s . 
As Montigny was we l l ent renched a t Gore t ty , soon on 
2nd September the armed c i t i z e n s surrounded the f o r t i f i c a t i o n 
of Montigny. Although ?,'!ontigny had a big army a t h i s 
command and was determined t o ac t a g a i n s t the p r e s e n t se t up a t 
Chandernagore. But the news of h i s d i s m i s s a l had completely 
s h a t t e r e d liim and he bowed down before the c i t i i : e n s ' m i l i t i a 
v / i thout o f fe r ing any r e s i s t a n c e . On 3rd September he v/as 
t aken t o Cliandernagore along wi th h i s c o l l a b o r a t o r s and 
imprisoned. 
The quick developments a t Chandernagore, however, did 
not imT)rpFP Lord Cornwal l is wlio had a l l along been symnnthetic 
1. ms. 2739 (^'-A.) 
2 . ms. 274 0 (I:'. A. ) 
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to ?.Iontigny. Lord Cornvvalli!;, t l icrcfore, wanted to r<^scue 
Montigny and h i s supporter:.- i'rora the clutches of Assembly at 
Chandernagore. He decided to put more pressure on 
Chandernagore. 
Goi'etty was segregnted from Chandernagoi'e by a very 
small s t r i p over which the English had cont ro l . The East 
India Company charged the Assembly with v io la t ing the Br i t i sh 
t e r r i t o r i a l r i gh t s by taking army across the s t r i p without 
i t s permission. Cornwallis asked the Chandernagoi^ 
adminis t ra t ion to release a l l the deta inees arres ted at 
Goretty. Tie surrounded the French colony with 2000 t roops. 
The Committee remained undeterred and threatened to eliminate 
a l l the prisoners i f the English intervened in t h e i r a f f a i r s . 
The English troops quickly withdrew in the face of t h i s 
th rea t . 
Montigny was subjected to in te r roga t ions by the 
Assembly on several, chargi's. lie however declined to ansv/er 
them as he refui.cd to recognise the va l i d i t y of the Committee. 
The Assembly, thei'eupon was of the view tha t l.lontigny and 
his supporters should be desnatched to France for t r i a l by 
National Assembly. The Committee took t h i s decision in the 
face of an ap irehension that the Englidh might intervene 
to obtain the re lease of l.lontigny and h i s supporters if 
1. Lebarnadie, op. c i t . pp. 227-230 
2 . ms. 2765 ( P . A.) 
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t h e i r t r i a l wns held at ChnndernagorG. 
On 1 ct October l/Ionti-^ny and h is col laboratore were 
sent aboard a boat renamed the ' P a t r i o t e ' to the mouth of 
Hoogoly where a hi^[^,cr sinio had anchored to carry thom to 
1 
the i s l e of b'rance. Moreover on 5th Octobor the Br i t i sh 
seized the Pa t r io te and demanded the handing over of Montigny 
and h i s supporters. The French vesse l was forced to surrender 
the capt ives who were takentCalcutta . 
The Br i t i sh by impounding the boat demanded the 
Chandernagore Assembly to sa t i s fy that the Treaty of 
Versa i l l es in moving the troops to Goretty without the i r 
consent, was v io la ted . 
The Chandernagore Assembly protested against the 
unauthorised ac t ion on the part of the Br i t i sh and demanded 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n on Lord Cornvvallis' o unwarranted interference in 
2 
re leas ing Montigny and h i s protagonis ts . No reply was sent 
3 by the East India Company a u t h o r i t i e s of Calcutta. 
Mottet took over as the successor of Montigy at 
Chandernagore. However, he met the same fa te and was forced 
1. ms. 2777 (?.A.) 
2. For a detailed account of the diSDute wi1ii the Calcutta 
Government after the capture of Goretty leading to the 
attack on the Chandernagore, see ms. 2778 (.'.A.) 
3. Complaints againr.t the conduct of the British Government 
in India having been m:'de by the inhabitants of Chandernagor 
and transmitted to Europe for the consideration of the 
French National Assembly, see ms. 2779 (P. A.) 
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to take asylum at Calcutta. On 10th February, 1791. 
Montigny left Calcutta for Prance. He bade adieu to his 
well wishers and assured them that he would ask for fair 
1 
play in Paris. 
At Chandernn^^ore Honti/^ny h.-id been very unnopular 
and the Pondicherry Government f a i l e d t o r e p l a c e him by a 
more shrewd person wi thout the consent of the Governor 
General . Montigny was c a l l e d back and de Fresne the 
Governor of Pondicherry was l e f t f ree t o put t h i n g s in 
order a t Chandernagore. He decided t o send a competent and 
s e l f assured person t o cool down the temper and pacify 
Chandernagore. 
The s i t u a t i o n improved wi th the appointment of 
2 Cossigny as Governor-General i n August,1790. " The Governor-
General d e s i g n a t e , adopted n c o n s i d e r a t e p o s t u r e . 
De Ganaple was appointed t o succeed Montigny a t 
Chandernagore. Cossigny s t a t e d t h a t he would depend upon 
the advice of the Governor of Pond icher ry , being the man 
on the soot . Thus de Presme decided t o d e a l wi th the 
1. Labernadie-op. c i t . p p . 249-250 
An anonymous memoire, La Revo lu t ion de Chandernagore on 
r e l a t i o n des t r o u b l e s qui ont l i e u dans c e t t e colonie 
eh 1790 g ive s a complete and i m p a r t i a l n a r r a t i o n of the 
course of even t s a t Chandernagore during the e a r l y pa r t 
of the Kevolut ion t h e r e , ms. 2785 (P.A.) 
2. mss. 1279 
3. mss. 1281 
4. mss. 1296. 
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Chandernagore unrer.t tactfully. He knew very well that 
the arrival of a new incimbent at Chandernagore would take 
some time. At the same tine it was imperative to assuage 
the feelings of the residents of Chandernagore. 
As an interim arrc'in.";cmont, therefore, de Presne 
decided to send Mottet who had the experience of Chandernagore 
administration. He was instructed to inform the Chandernagore 
Committee about his temporary assignment, till the arrival 
of do Canaple. 
He v/as to act as a conciliator than an administrator 
and his main aim was to reinvigorate and restrengthen the 
economy which was in shambles since the Revolutionary Committee 
came into power. The trade and Commerce had come to a 
grinding halt at Chandernagore. The commercial activities 
had reached to an all time low. The vessels had not 
visited Chandernagore in greater numbers as before and after 
the outbreak of revolution. In the lace of troubled 
conditions 1^ 'rench Traders hnd fled and taken shelter at 
places like Chinsurah,Terampore and Calcutta. The 
Revolutionary Committee was both extravagant and reckless in 
spending the scarce resources of the company. Money for 
this reckless spending v/as sec^ ured by draining the 
1. mss. 1295 
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Government t r e a s u r y and u t i l i z i n g ; unau thor i sed ly the funds 
1 
and goods of the Company. Tlie "IUnp;ali p o p u l r t i o n of Chander-
nagore was sub j ec t to e x t o r t i o n s and exac t ions under the 
euphemis t ic name of "forced loan" . 
r.iottct reached Chanderm.'^orc on 5th November, 1700. JJe 
was accorded r e c e p t i o n which was by no means f r i e n d l y . On the 
c o n t r a r y he was i n t e r r o g a t e d for s e v e r a l days and was t r e a t e d 
"almost lilce a c r i m i n a l " , on h i s a r r i v a l a t Chandernagore. The 
Committee ir-fact suspected and d e s t r u s t e d him. The Committee 
a t l a s t decided t o recognise him as the head of the execut ive 
bu t not without c u r t a i l i n g h i s powers. The Committee 
r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l over f i n a n c e , p o l i c y and j u s t i c e . 
Th is arrangement was to l a s t t i l l the drawing up of a 
new c o n s t i t u t i o n fo r Chanuernagore. Mot te t was forb idden to 
have any con tac t with the Chiefs of the Danish and Dutch 
s e t t l e m e n t s in Bengal , because they had g iven help t o 
Montigny. He was a l so ordered t o demand r e p a r a t i o n from them 
for the ou t r age , Committed on the French Vesse l s of 
Chandernagore. Motte t played a second f i d d l e t o the Committee 
and was bound t o execute and implement the laws, promulgated by 
2 
the Committee. He was under i n s . t r uc t i ons not t o t ake any 
independent d e c i s i o n . As a mat te r of grace he was allov/ed 
only to communicate wi th the Governor of Pondicher ry . 
1. P r o t e s t of the Company's agen ts a t Chandernfigore, 
ms. 2781 (P. A.) 
2 . About M o t t e t ' s miss ion in Chandernagore, see ms. 1301(P.A.) 
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Motte t hr;d t o t)ut up v/itli the coridit iont; , ininof;ed 
by the Cominittec. FIc couUi ru't clocijle t o rvr-n 1/iy do'.vri h in 
o f f i ce for raw of n e r i e c u t 1 on by the- Committee. Tie war, in 
search of an onoor tun i ty ;ind n pi'eto:xt t o f^et out of 
Chandernagore. On the p r e t e x t of nettlinf^ t h e iiueotion of 
opium and s a l t wi th the Eas t I nd i a Company, Mot te t l(^ft 
Chandernagore e a r l y in December and s tayed on in Ca lcu t t a 
from where he despatched a l eng thy r e p o r t t o de Fresne . 
In January 1791 » the d i f f e r e n c e s erupted ainon/: the 
members of the Revolu t ionary Committee a t Chandernagore. The 
Committee was now s t r i f e t o r n . P e o p l e , opposing d i c t a t o r i a l 
p r a c t i c e s of Richemont were charged with scheming t o overthrow 
2 
the p re sen t regime. They were thrown i n t o the p r i s o n . 
many of the accused succeeded i n escap ing from the Chandernagore 
p r i s o n . 
Mottet at Calcutta decided that the time wan ripe 
for him to act and employ stern measures to end lawlessness 
and disorder at Chandernagore. He made a request to Lord 
Cornwallis to allow him to take French troops through the 
British territory. He also appealed to the Committee at 
Chandernagore to allow him to act but his request was 
turned down. 
1. About Mottet's mission in Bengal, see ms. 1304 (?.A.) 
2. ns. 2784, 2786, 2791 (P.A.) 
3. ms. 2791 (P. A.) 
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In the raennv/hile the newly appointed Commandant, 
de Cana^^le reached Calcutta on 12th February. Mottet heaved 
a sigh of r e l i e f on bein '^7; discl-iarciea of r c i ;pons ib i l i t i e s . 
He la id dov/n h i s office and handed over the charge to 
de Cariaple. Jle had fai led in the task of pacifying Qhander-
nagore and returned to Pondicherry. 
De Canaple had been a Commandant a t Mahe from November 
1787 to April 1790 and he remained a t the top of the a f f a i r s 
before the eruption of the revolut ionary t roubles the re . He 
returned to the i s l e of Prance with the in tent ion of re turning 
to France. But Conway appointed him as the Commandant of 
Chandernagore in July, 1790. 
De Canaple was under ins t ruc t ions from Conway and 
Cossigny to be mild and conc i l i a to ry in deal ing v/ith the 
Committee. He l e f t for Chandernagore a t the s t a r t of 
September, 1790. On reaching Chandernagore, de Canaple 
requested, de Fresne to authorise him to run the Chandernagore 
adminis t ra t ion. Accordingly de Fresne sent him another set 
of i n s t ruc t ions and also requested the Chandernagore Committee 
1 
to accept de Cnnaplo wit?i a good grace. 
In h i s i n s t ruc t i ons de Fresne made provision for the 
contingency of the new Commandant not being acceptable to the 
Chandernagore Committee. In tha t case he was to take un h i s 
1. ms. 1330, 1331, 2782 (P.A.) 
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residence in Calcutta and get himself recognised by Lord 
Cornwallis and the Chiefs of the other foreign settlements 
as the accredited representative of Prance in Bengal and to 
occupy himself with the sale of opium and salt, 
De Canaple arrived in Calcutta on 12th February, 1791. 
He despatched a letter to the Chandernagore Committee along 
with the instructions of de Presne. He did not rush to 
Chandernagore straight from. Calcutta. He sought an assurance 
from the Committee to coopernte with him. 
The Committee in reply expressed dismay over the 
attitude of de Canaple. He was afraid to come to Chandernagore 
2 
although he expressed his loyalty to the revolution. 
The Committee also felt angry that de Canaple should 
have got instructions from the Governor of Pondicherry whose 
•5 
authority the citizens of Chandernagore on longer recognised. 
De Canaple there upon decided to remain stationed at 
Calcutta and look after the sale of opium and salt. At the 
end of June he was plagued by a fatal disease to which he 
succumbed on 5th August 1791. 
After his sad demise, the British Government closed 
down the office of the French administration in Calcutta 
5 
till the advent of a new Commandant. While de Canaple was 
1. ms. 2787 (P. A.) 
2. Ibid 
3. ms. 2788 (P.A.) 
4. ms. 2805 (P.A.) 
5. ms. 2800 (P. A.) 
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in the death bod, the ChRtnlernn/^oi'e Committee clnndestinely 
despatched a delegation coraprioinfi Lon^ c^hnmp and l^icard to 
the Assembly of the i s l e of Pranceto place before i t the 
complaints against the Commandant. At the same time i t made 
a f i e ry appeal to the Pondicherry garr ison to revolt against 
the tyranny of de Fresne and the react ionary Assembly of 
1 
tha t place , 
The h o s t i l e address only widened the gulf between 
Pondicherry and i s l e of Prance, both adopting d i f fe ren t 
2 p o l i c i e s to pacify t roubles a t Chandernagore . 
The Assembly of the i s l e of Prance r i gh t fnorn the 
inception of the eruption a t Chnndoranagore had stood by 
the anti-Montigry revolut ionary fac t ion . The delegation 
of LongchetTip and jJicard made tremendous impact on the 
Assembly. I t brought pressure on Cossigi^ t o in ter fere in 
the a f f a i r s of Chandernagore. In July he decided to r e c a l l 
de Cahtaple and to send tv/o Concil iat ion Commissioners Gautier 
4 5 
ard Yuon to Bengal , 
The information of t h i s d r a s t i c change reached Porxiicherry 
a t the s t a r t of August. De FTesh^ considered i t as a personal 
challenge to him . On 7th August the Pondicherry Assembly 
1. ms. 2001 (P . A.) 
2 . ms. 2802 (? .A . ) 
3 . ms. 2802 (P. A.) 
4. In 1789 he wrote his notes L;ur le Bengale, a lengthy document 
of more than 100 pages, mas.1142 (P.A.) Yuen's notes have been 
Summarised by M.Bnrdet in an article entitled "Cnandernagore 
in 1789" published in the Revue Historique de 1' Irde 
Prancaise, Vol IV, pt II,1952CP.A.) 
5. me. 1443 (P.A.) 
6. ms. 1445 (p. A.) 
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passed a r e so lu t ion p ro tes t ing against the interference of 
the iPle of France in the nffnix-t- of Chandemagore by sending 
a Concil iat ion Commission. 
The Pondicherry Assembly was encouraged by the 
recogni t ion i t got from the National Assembly in Prance. I t s 
deput ies were accepted as the accredited represen ta t ives 
of French India . I t claimed tha t the Pondicherry Assembly was 
in no way subject to the Government of the i s l e of France and 
tha t i t alone had f u l l control over the Indian set t lement. 
F i n a l l y , a t the request of the Assembly, de Fresne 
decided t o send i t s Pres ident , Fumeron to Bengal not as 
Commandant for he had no au thor i ty to make such an appointment 
but siiaply as an agent to look a f te r the i n t e r e r t s of the 
2 
Nation . 
Pumeron was to try to bring the Chandernagore Committee 
to reason and to induce the citizens to elect representatives 
to the new Colonial Assembly at Pondicherry, failing which he 
was to convoke a meeting of the emigres to elect representatives 
for Chandernagore. 
The Conciliation Commissioners from the Isle of Prance 
reached Chandernagore on 10th September and on 12th September 
1. Deliberations of the colonial Assembly, August 7, 1791, 
ms. 1457 (P.A.) 
2. ms. 1458 (P.A.) 
5. ms. 1462 (P.A. ) 
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Pumeron had the same mission, to res to re order a t Chandernagore 
but the i r modus operandi v/as so en t i r e ly d i f fe ren t that no 
1 
agreement was poss ib le . 
Gautier and Yvon at Cliandernagore aril Furneron in Calcutta 
soon a f t e r - t h e i r a r r i v a l hfid a voluminous correspondence, each 
side t rying to convince the other of the r a t i o n a l i t y of 
i t s view point. '" 
The Concil iat ion Commissioners were of the view tha t 
only the c i t i zens of Chandernagore should determine th(?ir 
des t iny. They should set up a system of t h e i r l iking and 
no outside pressui-e should be brought on them against t h e i r 
w i l l . The Conci l ia t ion Commissioners were also protagonist 
of keeping a l l the French set t lements in India under the 
control of the I s le of Prance. They were of the opinion tha t 
the Pondicherry Government had no locus standi in the a f f a i r s 
4 
of Chandernagore. 
Regarding the sale of opium, the two Comnicsioners 
favoured Chandernagore sincie i t wai'. an a r t i c l e of Bengal. 
According to them Chandernngore alone had the r igh t to be 
benefited from the sale of opium, but as a matter of compromise 
i t could set aside a part of the sale for other French 
5 
settlements in India. 
1. ras. 1463 (P.A.) 
2. ms. 2815 (P.A.) 
3. ins. 2817 (P.A.) 
4. ms. 2819 (P.A.) 
5. ms. 2820 (P. A.) 
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Pumeron on the other hand, vehemently refuted the 
charge tha t Por.dicherry had no control over Chandernagore. 
He was also of the view tha t the Government of t h e I s le of 
Prance had no r i g h t to intervene in the a f f a i r s of 
Chandernagore. Secondly he declared tha t by accordiiTg 
autonomy to Chandernagore under the present circumstances 
would be tantamount to sustaining a d i c t a t o r i a l regime which 
had already driven out the l i be r ty loving c i t i z e n s , from the 
colony. Thirdly, on the question of opium he based h i s argument 
on a current order of the minis te r , earmarking the revenue 
from the sale of t h a t a r t i c l e to the general revenues of the 
Prench Colonies in Ind ia , to be disbursed by the Pondicherry 
Government. 
F ina l ly the controversy was put to an end by the decis ion 
of 1±ie Calcutta Goveriiment, recognising Pumeron as the o f f i c i a l 
Prench representa t ive in Bengal and handing over to him the 
quantity of opium fixed by the Anglo-Prench Convention of 
1787 on 5th October.^ 
I t was a big triumph for /umeron and the Pondicherry 
Government. Chandernagore was deprived of the revenue from the 
sale of opium. The autonomy of Chandernagore as a r e s u l t of 
t h i s arrangement J was in jeopaixly. 
1. Ibid 
2. Calcutta Council to Pumeron, October 5 , 1791 , 
rass. 2821 (P. A.) 
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The Br i t i sh recognit ion nccorcled to Fumeron, did not 
v/orry e i the r the Revolutionary Committee at Chandernagore or 
the Conci l ia t ion Coraraissioners, at a l l . A general assembly 
of the c i t i zens was held for the purpose on 17th October. The 
emigres did not p a r t i c i p a t e . Instead they convened another 
assembly in Calcutta a few days I n t e r . 
The Kevolutionary Committee at Chandernagore and the 
Concil iat ion Commissioners were determined to draft a new 
cons t i tu t ion for the set t lement . On 6th November the General 
Assembly of Chandernagore drafted a new cons t i tu t ion nnd 
2 implemented i t with immediate effect . 
The cons t i tu t ion adoptrd by Chandernagore Assembly 
declared i t s e l f completely free from the control of Pondicherry. 
There was to be a repi-esentritive of the King, but the r e a l 
powers were vested in the General Assembly; comprising a l l 
the act ive c i t i zens of 25 ycarf. of age, or over and the 
r e s iden t s of the set t lement. Th«fry were t o e l ec t an Ansemblee 
Administrative which was to meet once in three months. A smaller 
body called the Directorate wn, to be In charge of the 
adminis t rat ion during the recess of the meetings of the 
Assemblee Administrative. 
The General Ast;embly was to meet once in a year. I t also 
1. me. 2831, 2833, 2835, 2837 (^ .A.) 
2. Consti tut ion Provisoire de la colonie de Chandernagore, 
ms. 2842 (P. A.) 
Also consult Labernadie, o p . c i t . pp. 279-90 
3 . ms. 2843 (P .A. ) 
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elected two judicial tribunal,"::, one for the Europeans and 
the other for Indians. On the second tribunal also, there 
was to be a Frenchman as judf^ c but he was to be assisted by 
the Indian Assessors who were to be elected by the Indian 
-1 
inhabitants. Inspired by the i-'rench Kevolution the French 
colonialists could not shake off their prejudices and that 
was the only crumb of 'equality' and 'fraternity' offered to 
2 
Indians. 
After the introduction of the new constitution Gautier 
returned to tlie Isle of France. Yvon remained Commandant at 
Chandernagore. Soon lUchemont also returned to the same place 
to advocate the cause of the citizens of Chandernrigore against, 
the tyrannical interference of the Pondicherry Government. His 
advocacy was a grand success and he returned to Bengal in 
June 1792. 
In the meantime Cossigny despatched an official order 
to de Fresne to recall Fumeron at once and desit-.t f i-oni 
interfering in the mntterr; of Clinndcrnngore till the arrival 
of Civil Commissioners from !''rance, who were to take over 
shortly. 
It was insultirg for de Fresne but he had neverthless 
to comply with the orders of the French Governor-General. 
1. ras. 2845 (P.A.) 
2. ms. 2845 (P. A.) 
3. ms. 1886 (P.A.) 
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Fumeron could not leave Ber^ 'al bccaur.e of the oad 
demise of Yvon. In the meantime Cossigny was replaced by 
Malartic as Governor-General. Therefore, the departure of 
Fumeron v/as delayed by a few nonths. On the other hand the 
incumbency of I.Talartic gave a fresh lease of life to the 
Pondicherry Government to interfere in the affairs of 
Chandernagore. But this was not to be so because Malartic 
wrote to de tresne advising to send back Fumeron and to 
leave the affairs of Chander})ngore in the same state in v/hich 
they had remained during the time of Cossigny. To humilate 
de Fresne further, Malartic appointed Gautier as Commandant 
at Chandernagore. Gautier could not return to Bengal. Tie 
reached Pondicherry with Lesca.llier one of the Civil 
Commissioners, and remained stranded there till the seizure 
2 
of the colony by the East India Company, 
Fumeron however left Calcutta in October 1792. He 
again took over at Pondicherry as President of the colonial 
3 
Assembly.'^  
For half a year the lawlessness remained unabated 
a t Chandernagore, and the emigres in Calcutta remained 
poverty ridden and d e s t i t u t e . F ina l ly a l l the i l l - w i l l and 
enmities among the French in Bengal were set a t r e s t by the 
1. ms. 1888 (P.A.) 
2 . ras. 1890 (P.A.) 
3 . ms. 1893 (P .A.) 
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incarcera t ion of a l l the emigres in Calcut ta , and capture 
of Criarderragore by the East India Company on 11th June, 1793 
following the advent of the news of war in Europe. 
'•Ye have no records to show what res i s tance was 
offered by the c i t i z e n s of Chandernrgore perhaps, none at 
a l l . 
The news of the revolution in French st irred the 
French colonieB in India; Chandernagore, in particular 
adopted a new constitution. Inspite of t h i s . Equality and 
Fraternity was denied to Indians, Moreover, the differences 
between the o f f i c i a l s of I s le of France, Pondicherry and 
Chandernagore were more of personality clashes rather than 
any change in the ir po l i c i e s and attitude. 
1. Secret Committee t o the Governor-General, June 11, 
F.D., 1793 (KAI). 
chapter I I 
The French Menace and 3ast India Company (1789-1803) 
As a consequence of tiie lour, ol American Colonies, 
Lord Cornv/allis was ins t ructed to adopt a pac i f i c and 
defensive policy as l a id down in the Act of 1784. But the 
French Hevolution had burst forth with unexampled fury and 
a l l Europe was heaving with Commotion. Therefore, at t ha t 
time in te rna t iona l expediency ra ther than any set p r inc ip l e s 
guided h i s de l ibera t ions and p o l i c i e s , Cornwallis apprehended 
an a n t i - B r i t i s h a l l i ance in India under the aegis of French 
2 in the event of an Anglo-French conf l ic t in Europe. 
He thundered that any intervent ion of the French with a 
view to d i s tu rb the peace of India or sow discord among the 
princes and inhab i t an t s , would not be t o l e r a t e d . 
Lord Cornwallis was the f i r s t Governor-General in 
India to r ea l i ze tha t the suppression of the French p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t i e s in India should be made the main p r inc ip le of 
3 
B r i t i s h policy. He was not disposed to concede any p o l i t i c a l 
r i g h t s or p r iv i l eges to the French whom he considered to 
be res id ing in India for the purpose of trade only. 
Lord Cornwallis kept a t igh t control over the northern 
1. Beveridge, H., A Comprehensive History of India 
Vol I I , 1871, p. 6u0. 
2. ChathamPapers, Vol 176, Scott to P i t t , January 22, 1790 
quoted in Ph i l ips C.H., East India Company, 196I, p .67. 
3 . Ross, Charles, Correspondence of Charles, F i r s t Marquis 
Cornwallis. Vol I I , 1859, pp.20-22. 
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1 
s t a t e s so tha t he could deal with the "Tipu menace". 
Consequently, he defeated Tipu and forced him to sign a 
humiliat ing Treaty of Seringapatara by which h i s power was 
2 
crippled. This was the g rea tes t p o l i t i c a l achievement of 
of Lord Cornwallis who enhanced Br i t i sh p o s i t i o n , pres t ige 
and resources in India. 
The disturbancGs in Eui'ope which ensued upon the 
French devolution, threatened to affect the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 
•5 in India. But the Revolutionary v/ar brought no t roubles 
to the English on Indian s o i l . By Ai^ust 1795, Cornwallis 
had the s a t i s f ac t i on of congratulat ing the Court of Directors 
on the reduction of a l l the French sett lements and f ac to r i e s 
a t Chandernagore in north India. His services were applauded 
and the House of Commons recommended in 1793 tha t h i s statue 
5 
should be placed in the court room at the India House. 
Sir John Shore, the successor of Lord Cornwallis 
was also a non- in te rvent ion is t . The period following the 
oubbreak of the Revolutionary war in Europe, was one of 
uneasy peace in India. The war in Europe expanded and involved 
1. On Ser^tember 7, 1791, Dundas told Grenville,"We should have 
Seringapattam before Parliament meets" Home Misc. 362 F 102 
September 7 , 1791 quoted in Phi l ips o p . c i t . , p. 68 
2. P o l i t i c a l l e t t e r to Court of Di rec tors , January 17,1794(NAI) 
3 . P o l i t i c a l l e t t e r to Court of Direc tors , August 1,1793 (NAI) 
4. P o l i t i c a l l e t t e r s to Coiurt of Di rec tors , August 13,1793(NAI) 
5 . Severidge, op .c i t , p.640 
6. P o l i t i c a l l e t t e r to Court of Direc tors , May 15, 1794 (NAI) 
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the East also, thereby brought the unsettled question of 
Indian supremacy once more to the forefront. 
The political situation in north India v/itnessed 
the rise of Scindhia in the 1770's. Mahadaji Scindnia 
brought back the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam to Delhi from 
Allahabad. This enhanced the prestige of Scindhia. The 
modernisation of Scindhia's army under the supervision of 
French further alarmed the East India Company. The rise of 
Scindhia power was viewed by the British as a replacement 
to the depleted authority of Ihe Mughal Empire filling the 
2 
political vacuum in India. 
The first European adventurer to be employed by Scindhia, 
was de Boigne who fii*et entered the service of Scindhia in 
1784. He was entrusted v/ith the task of raising two infantry 
battalions of 850 men each equipped and trained on European 
model. He was given a salary of rupees one thousand a month. 
His force demonstrated the prowress by establishing Scindhia's 
authority in north India. De Boigne was asked to raise 
three brigades of 18,000 regular infantry, 600 irregulars, 
2000 irregular horses,600 Afghan cavalry and 2uU0 guns in 
1790. 
1. Political letter to Court of Directors, November 21, 
1791 (KAI). 
2. Smith, v., The Oxford History of India, 1919, p. 359 
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For the mair.tenance of this army, a vast area in the 
Doab consisting of 52 districts and yielding an annual revenue 
of 22 lakhs of rupees was assigned to de Boigne who acted as 
1 
an independent potentate. The fortress of Agra was given to 
him to serve as his ammunition centre and he kept his base 
2 
at Aligarh. 
When Mahadaji Scindhia s tar ted for Poona 1793, de Boigne 
was l e f t behind p r ac t i c a l l y as the caretaker r u l e r of the 
Gwalior Kingdom. But the tu rn of Maratha p o l i t i c s af ter the 
sudden death of Mahadaji in 1794 made him fee l uneasy about 
h i s future and a t the end of 1795, he gave up the services of 
Scindhia with the re luc tan t consent of Daulat Rao Scindhia 
and went back to Europe, carrying h i s colossal r i ches amassed 
during h i s stay in India, 
De Boigrte rendered a great service t o Scindhia. I t 
was he who organised h i s scat tered fo rces , t ra ined them in 
European Style and imparted t o them a new d i s c i p l i n e . 
1. Sen, S.P. j The French in India . 1958, p . 543. 
2. The f o r t r e s s at Alighur (Aligarh) was a most valuable 
acqu i s i t ion , not merely on i t s own account but from the 
quant i ty of mi l i t a ry s to res wnich i t had French having 
made i t t h e i r Chief depot in the Doab. This se lec t ion 
was ce r ta in ly j u s t i f i e d by the na tura l and a r t i f i c i a l 
s t rength of the plan. This s i t e on an elevated p la in 
surrounded by sv/araps made i t pe r fec t ly inaccessible 
in the rainy season and every thing which the s k i l l 
of French engineers could devise, had been employed 
to add to i t s na tura l s t rength. 
Beveridge, o p . c i t . p . 760. 
41 
European of f icers and a r t i l l e r y men were invited by him to 
jo in the army and i t was through h i s e f fo r t s tha t i t a t tained 
the s t rength of 68 ba t ta l ions ,427 guns and 40,000 horses. 
The gue r i l l a t a c t i c s of warfare were abandoned and fine 
modern army was bu i l t under de Boigne. I t was t h i s army 
which defeated the Muslims and Rajputs and the a u x i l i a r i e s 
of Holkar in 1792 and es tabl ished Scindhias ascendancy in 
North India . ^ 
But by adopting the armament and t a c t i c s of European 
warfare, the Marathas los t the advantage of unanimity of 
nat ional , r e l i g i o u s or t r i b a l sentiments out of the bond of 
a common country or t r a d i t i o n . The new system required 
professional so ld i e r s and foreign o f f i ce r s . In t h i s manner 
the foreign or a l i e n element grew rapidly u n t i l the l a t e r 
Maratha armies became p r inc ipa l ly a miscellaneous col lec t ion 
of mercenaries, en l i s t ed from a l l pa r t s of India with trained 
infantry and a r t i l l e r y commanded by adventurers of different 
races and count r ies . 
Sir Phi l ip Francis hnd got a clause inserted in the 
Charter of 1793 v/hich aimed to pursue Schemes of the conquest 
and extent ion of dominion in India , repugnant to the wish, 
1, New Cambridge Modern History, Vol.IX, 1975, p.554. 
2. l y a l l . Sir Alfred, Rise and Expansion of Br i t i sh 
Dominionih India. 1907, p. 201 
«2 
the honour and the policy of the nat ion. 
Sir Shore sought t o show tha t he adhered to t h i s 
clause. England v/as up against the French Revolution a l so . 
The s i t ua t i on , a t tha t time prevented England to despatch 
a considerable reinforcement of troops to India during the 
continuance of Revolutionary wars in Europe. This impressed 
2 
upon Sir Shore to maintain peace with a l l the powers in India. 
Therefore, the Br i t i sh wanted to show the world t h e i r paci f ic 
in tent ions hence t h i s new clause was inser ted . But they were 
uneasy about the French th rea t to India. Lord Mornington, 
the Br i t i sh member told the House of Commons in 1794; "The 
r e a l cause of out present secur i ty i s to be found in our own 
exer t ions . By those exer t ions we were able t o withstand and 
repeal the f i r s t assaul t of the arms and p r inc ip l e s of France 
and the continuance of the same effort now forms our only 
ba r r i e r against the r e tu rn of the same danger. 
But the non- in tervent ionis t policy of ?ir John Shore 
imperil led the pos i t ion of tbe B r i t i s h i n India . His adhering 
to "non-intervention", only encouraged the Scindhia to employ 
the French Officers who trained and led h i s army. Naturally 
1. Kastury, N., History of Br i t i sh Occupation, undated, p.78. 
2. Beveridge, o p . c i t . p.666 
3 . Pearce, Memoirs and correspondence of 1he Most Noble 
Richard Marquess V/ellesley, Vol I , 1834, P. 113 
4. Holden Furber, Henry Dundas F i r s t Viscount MeIvile (1742-1811), 
undated, p. 134. 
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these French Officers fostert-d ill-feeling against the British 
in India. Sir Shore was also apprehensive of the designs of 
Perron who was given the Command of his army by Scindhia in 
north India after the retirement of de Boigne. 
Under Perron the army was increased by two more brigades 
and at the same time the character of the force changed. Perron 
recruited the French personnel increasing their number and 
appointing them in higher ranks in prefence to officials of 
other nationalities, many of whom left in disgust. 
The British v/ere alarmed by the activities of Perron. 
It has always been a principal object of the British Government 
to prevent the sovereign power of the Maratha State from 
2 
passing into the hands of French. 
The British were apprehensive that France with the 
help of Perron, would aim at establishing her authority 
within the Indian territory. The disturbed state of the 
Maratha empire "^  could afford an advantageous opportunity 
to France, for the succeesful prosecution of her favourite 
object of establishing a dominion within the Indian territory, 
by the introduction of a military force. A great territorial 
dominion extending towards, the left bank of the Indus through 
the Punjab and comprehending Agra, Delhi and large position 
1. Sen, op.cit., p.544 
2. William, D. , Marhatta Empire, 1935, p.9 
5. Political letter to Court of Directors, December 31, 
1796 (NAI) 
of the Doat of the Jamuna and Ganges was the most vulnerable 
pa r t . The personal and nonlrial author i ty of Shah Alam was in 
1 
the most abject and degrading subjection. 
Daulat Rao Scindhia held the appointment of Deputy 
or that of a regent , exercis ing alraoet independent pov/er of 
sovereinty under Shah Alam. Perron, t he re fo re , began to c a l l 
h i s army the imperial Army and himself, a servant and subject 
of the Mughal Emperor. Presumably the French intended to 
u t i l i z e the name of the Mughal Emperor to fur ther t h e i r designs 
in Ind ia , exercising imperial author i ty to r e - e s t ab l i sh t h e i r 
influence and power. 
I t v/as Sir Shore's misfortune t o s t r i ve to maintain a. 
policy whose bases were being s teadi ly shorn away by unexpected 
events . I t v/as h i s weakness not to perceive the new forces both 
a t home and abroad, which were threatening the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 
i n India . The changes and the new forces were two: f i r s t l y 
in Europe Kapoleon was concentrating men and t r anspor t s a t 
Toulon. With the support of Tallejrrand, Napoleon persuaded 
the Directory to switch t h e i r plans from an invasion of 
England to an expedit ion to Egypt. He condemned the invasion 
pro jec t as impract icable , and the th rea t to India offered 
b r i l l i a n t oppor tuni t ies for him. He rea l i sed t h a t "in Par i s 
1. Martin, M., Despatches Minutes and Correspondence of the 
Marquess 'yel les ley. Vol I I I . 1836. p.30 
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nothing i s remembered for lorig, i f I remain doing 
nothing for long, I am l o s t . " This considerably alarmed 
the B r i t i s h in the India House. 
Previously in February, 1796 Stephen Lushington, 
then Chairman of the East India Company had warned Dundas 
tha t i t v/as possible for the French to seize Egypt and to 
a t tack India by land. 
Secondly the growing French influence in north India 
a t the court of Scindhia was th rea ten ing . 
The next large scale expansion of B r i t i s h rule in 
India occurred during the 0-overnor-Generalship of Lord 
V/ellesley, who assumed office in 1798 at a time when the 
Br i t i sh were locked in a l i f e and death s truggle with France, 
Sir John Shore believed strongly in the power of the Br i t i sh 
navy to prevent any French invasion of India . But Lord 
Wellesley was determined to take strong precautionary as well 
as offensive measures to smash a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a 
2 
French rev iva l i n India. When Wellesley assumed office 
as Governor-General of Ind ia , the emergence of Revolutionary 
3 
France threatened the East India Company. 
He was concerned with a possible at tack due to the 
exp lo i t s of Napoleon. There was an uneasiness in London 
1. Board to Coui-t of Directors 1, F. 414, March 3 , 1796 
quoted in P h i l i p s , op. c i t . p. 101 
2. Martin, op. c i t . Vol. I pp. 6I-64 
3. Secret Coraniittee to the Governor-General, June 18 ^ 
1798 received in Calcutta in September, 1798 (NAI). 
46 
as well as in India over the French designs towards 
India . 
In a l e t t e r to the Resident a t Poonfi Lord 'Tellesley 
wrote; "But the nriraary object of a l l our vigi lance and 
care muet be the des t ruc t ion of every seed of the French 
party air*ady grown to so dangerous a height and s t i l l 
increasing in the armies and councils of the Nizara, of 
Scindiah and of Tipoo. The exclusion of the influence of 
Prance from the dominions of the native s t a t e s i s not more 
necessary to the pi^eservation of our ovm power, than to the 
2 happiness and prosper i ty of t h i s par t of the world." 
But i t i s to h i s minute tha t we must turn for an 
au thor i t a t ive ana lys is of the French th r ea t i n India as 
Lord V/ellesley saw i t . He wrote:"The systematic in t roduct ion 
of French Officers in to the service of a l l the native powers 
i s described by TIr. Vfickham as the fixed policy of Prance, 
adopted v/ith a view of es tab l i sh ing the most ce r t a in mean^ 
of subverting the foundation of our power". 
The f i r s t reference t o Perron in the voluminous 
wri t ings of Lord '.Vellesley, occurs in a l e t t e r wr i t t en from 
the Cape of Good Hope in February, 1798 and addressed to 
1 . Napoleon wrote to the Directory "The power v/hich i s 
mis t ress of Egypt, must become in the long run, the 
mistress of India as well" 
quoted in Sen. o p . c i t . p . 556. 
2. Martin, o p . c i t . Vol I p. 126 
3 . P o l i t i c a l l e t t e r to Court of Di rec to r s , August 12, 
1798 (MI) 
(a lso see Martin o p . c i t . Vol I pp. 174-75) 
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the Honourable Henry Dundas, the President of the Board 
of Control. It merely indicatec Lord Wellesley's knowledge 
that "Scindia employs about r'0,000 Sepoys, disciplined by 
Europeans or Americans. The commander is named Perron, 
a Frenchman". 
On 4th July, 1799 in a despatch to Colonel Palmer, 
the Resident at Poona, Lord Wellesley wrote: "The whole 
system of my policy is a sufficient earnest of my anxiety 
to expel the French from the service of Scindiah but it 
might be dangerous to proceed to any steps v/hich tend to 
2 fix Sciendiah in the interests of France". 
Under the influence of a succession of French 
adventurers in the service of Scindhia, the British Government 
had been exposed to French threat in India and even to the 
ambition and hostile spirit of the person who now ruled the 
French nation. Wellesley wrote to the Resident at Poona: 
"Perhaps it is not too sanguine a view of our situation to" 
consider the annihilation of the only native ally in India 
as the final ruin of all her ambitious and vindictive 
projects against this great source of the wealth and pov/er 
of Great Britain".^ 
1. Corapton, H., Military Adventurers of Hindustan, 
1892, p. 291. 
2. Martin, op.cit. Vol. I, p.6g 
3. Ibid p.98 
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The safety of the Br i t i sh dominion in India , e i ther 
with reference to a conteot with Soindhia, or t o a renewal 
of war with France, required the re fo re , the reduct ion of 
Per ron ' s power. I t became the duty of the B r i t i s h Government 
to be prepared to assume the pro tec t ion of i t s own t e r r i t o r i e s 
and to remove with i t s own e f f o r t s , the proximate cause of 
insecur i ty and alarm. The existence of Per ron ' s power was 
not the sole cause of the present concern for the Br i t i sh in 
India , although in the event of a renewal of war with Prance, 
i t might have proved highly dangerous to the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . 
In the meantime, the news of the sa i l ing of a French 
armament under Kapoleon Bonaparte v/as transmitted to India. 
The secre t despatch to the Governor-General expressed a 
p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s being destined for India . The Secret 
Committee was already of the opinion tha t the possession of 
Egypt by any great European power would be f a t a l to B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s in India. I t was also apprehensive^Napoleonic 
2 
outbui'st in r e l a t i o n to East pa r t i cu l a r l y India. I t a lso 
did not see any reason why the French object of reaching 
India should not be accomplished. 
The alarming menace, held out by the Revolutionary 
Prance to the B r i t i s h colonial i n t e r e s t s forced Dundas to 
1. Court of Directors to the Governor-General, June 18, 
1798 (NAI) 
2. "Hunting the English out of a l l t he i r Eastern possessions 
and cut t ing the Isthmus of Suez" 
Napoleon declared in Syria in 1798 
quoted in 
Sir Lyall o p . c i t . p.206. 
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i n s t ruc t lord Wellesley t o pursue an aggressive policy i n 
India , From the ins t ruc t ions he issued and from the act ions 
ani r e p l i e s of Wellesley i t seems l ike ly t ha t they hfd agreed 
probably before V/ellesley l e f t England tha t the "time was 
r ipe for an expansion of B r i t i s h India", Dundas wrote to 
the Governor-General V/ellesley tha t he based h i s policy 
on the p r inc ip l e " that the way to defeat France i s to take 
a l l her colonies and t o destroy her t r ade" . In London the 
Tory minis t ry was governing B r i t a i n by measures t h a t could 
3 be described as a r b i t r a r y coercion. 
During t h i s per iod , the manipulations of the French 
in India had reached the high watermark and the opposition 
from the Indian pov/ers had also reacheito an unprecedented 
l eve l . The French were more popular in India than the 
B r i t i s h , These Frenchmen were always favourably received by 
the native pr inces . Lord V.'ellesley never los t sight of the 
interdependence of India and England in t h e i r involvement 
with France in Europe. 
In combating the French menace Lord V/ellesley 
received fu l l support from the P i t t ' s ministry thougllhe 
did not get the sympathies of the Court of Directors who 
had frowned a t the extention of company's dominions and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in India. They were uneasy and concerned 
1. Board's secre t Draf ts , Oct. 2,31,1799 (KAI) 
2. Ibid 
3 . Governor-General to the Court of Di rec tors , January 25,1800 
quoted in P h i l i p s , C,H,, Gorregpondence of David Scott, 
1915, p.20 
4 . Hutton, W,H,, Lord \7ellesley (Rulergof India Se r i e s ) , 
1893, p.135. 
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1 
over the mounting Indiahdebt. The policy pursued by -ftie 
sagacious Governor-Gcn3ral aid not rest solely upon the 
local Indian situation, lie had fully realised that India had 
been drawn into the vortex of European politics and as 
such Indian politics must imperatively be dictated by the 
2 
needs of the situation in Europe. 
The policy of deliberate expansion with which 
V/ellesley identified himself was to a great extent engendered 
by the presence of Perron at Scindhia's court. The designs 
of the French adventurers in the service of native states 
were becoming clear during the time of Lord V/ellesley. The 
dominant conception in Indian statesmenship had hitherto been 
the preservation of balance of power between Mysore, Hyderabad 
in South and the Scindhia in North. It depended largely 
on the acquiescence of the three Indian pov/ers which the 
British thought, could not be continuously depended upon. 
In the changed circumstances, the external threat * 
had also to be reckoned with. Evidently, should France 
succeed in achieving a renewed footing on Indian soil as 
the ally of .Scindhia or of Holkar, the British would 
3 
certainly have to fight for life. This was more imperative 
because the native states had ;French Officers and sepoy 
1. D. Scott to v/ellesley, August 9> 1801, quoted in 
Philips, op.cit., p.33'r-
2. Innes^ Arthur. D, A Short History of the British in 
India, 1915, pp. 156-37. 
5. Political letter to Court of Directors, January 18, 
1800 (WAX) 
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Wellesley was determined to combat the French 
influence in India. Under the subsidiary alliances concluded 
with the native states, he forced them to accept the English 
Company as a Paramount Power and to turnout all the French, 
employed v/ith them. They were also forbidden from having 
any direct correspondence witti the French. To keep a close 
watch on these native states, British Residents were posted 
at the courts of these rulers. The presence of the English 
troops was essential in the states for which the Indian rulers 
paid. All these measures were intended to combat French 
2 influence at the court of Indian rulers. 
For these measures he was applauded in House of 
Commons for counteracting with equal promptitude and 
ability, the dangerous intrigues and projects of the French 
in India.-^  
The beginning of the year 1802 marks a Y/atershed in 
the Governor-Generalship of Lord '.Yellesley. He had achieved 
unparalleled success as a conqueror and annexer. He had 
vanquished many a states, extended protection over Oudh, 
relieving hes: of important frontier provinces.'^ 
1. Martin, o p . c i t . Vol I I , p .39. 
2 . New Cambridge o p . c i t . p.554 
3 . Sir Lyall , o p . c i t . p.214 
4 . New Cambridge o p . c i t . p.554 
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The extent of '7ellesley's distrust of the French 
and his countermeasures against their machinations can not 
"be "better understood than from his instructions to the 
Resident at Oudh: "My principle is very simple: '.vhenever I find 
a Frenchman in India, in this may power, I will send him hack 
to Europe and I desire that you will adopt this principle as 
general rule of your conduct from which you are never to 
depart excepting in cases of a very special nature, which 
you will always report to me for my determination". 
In May 1802, Mr. Bosanquet, then Chaiunan of the Court 
of Directors, wrote to the Marquis Wellesley, informing him 
that the French Grovernment was exceedingly jealous of British 
sovereinty in India, declaring his conviction that the peace 
recently made with France could not be lasting, and advising 
his excellency to be prepared for whatever might ensure upon 
2 its violations. Such was the perception of the Company 
authorities about the Treaty of Amiens.^ 
In India Lord Y/ellesley in fact never liked the 
Treaty of Amiens providing for a restoration of French 
territories in India and had expressed his misgivings about 
a possible return of the French in his despatch to Court 
1 
of Directors. He also feared that the French might try 
1. Martin, op.cit. "Vol. II, p.55 
2. Beveridge, op.cit, p.739 
3. Political letter from Court of Directors May, 1802(MI) 
4. Political letter to Court of Directors, February 28,1803(NAI) 
(Also see Martin, op.cit. Vol. I, p.31) 
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to regain the l o s t pos i t ion in north India by increasirg 
1 
t h e i r influence over the Mughal Emperor. 
Although the Treaty of Amiens was not upto the 
expectations of ITapoleon, the F i r s t Consul was not wi l l ing 
to give up hopes about im^-)roving the French pos i t ion in 
India . He was not inclined to take any rash step which would 
arouse English suspicions and endanger peace but at the same 
time he wanted h i s agents to make secre t mi l i t a ry and diploma-
t i c preparat ions in India which could be u t i l i zed by the 
2 French on the next outbreak of war. 
For l^Iapoleon, India was not an important issue to 
r i s k a war with England yet he f e l t tha t when a war broke 
out with England, the French in India could s t r i k e an 
effect ive blow on English i n India . He was aware of the 
dangers involved in sending out to Indiana large force to 
India which would at once arouse the suspicions of the 
English. Instead he decided t o nominate an enterpr is ing 
General Decaen t o take charge of the Indian possessions 
and placed the services of a large numbers of young o f f i c e r s , 
who would be able to t r a i n up a considerable body of sepoy 
force. The F i r s t Consul v/as en thus ias t i c about the Indian 
e n t e r p r i s e , although there was a grov/ing r e a l i s a t i o n in 
1. Martin o p . c i t . vol IV p. 597 
2 . Sen, o p . c i t , p. 56l 
5. Nolan, E.H., History of Br i t i sh Empire, undated p.492 rr 
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France about the futility of attempting a revival of Pranoh 
Political influence in India. There was apparently a general 
lack of enthusiasm and urgency in executing the plan of 
expelling the British from India. But the proposed French 
expedition to India under Decaen made the India House uneasy. 
Decaen received his instructions from First Consul on 
15th February, 1803. Napoleon advised him to use diplomacy, 
2 tact and caution v/hile dealing with the English in India. 
He also advised hin to provide for war while observing 
the stipulations of peace. Decaen was required to establish 
secret contacts with the Indian states and to lay down plans 
3 
for any future war. 
On March 6, 1803 Napoleon allov/ed an expedition under 
Decean to sail for India from France. Soon the First Consul 
forgot these assurances and ignored all appeals from Decaen 
for timely reinforcement. No naval support was extended to 
Decaen apparently because the French commitments in Europe 
had preference over the plans drawn for India. As a result 
of indifferent attitude of Napoleon tov/ards his repeated 
requests to send men and arms to India, Decaen returned to 
France v/ithout achieving ar^ / success. 
1. "Castlereagh avoided further argument by sending special 
information to Lord '-Tellcsley for example that Decaen 
would ss.il for India with a squadron of French ships". 
Secret Committee Minutes, November 3,17,1802 (NAI) 
2. Nolan, o p . c i t . p . 492 
3 . Secre t Committee Minutes , March 16 , Apr i l 4 , 1803(MI) 
4 . S i r L y a l l , o p . c i t . p.224 
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T i l l 1802 the Maratha confederacy remained the only 
formidable power confronting Lord V'/ellesley. The Maratha 
sovereignty stretched from tlie sltorcc of Malabar to the 
confines of the Punjab, holding svvay in North India, furnished 
suff ic ient scope for French manipulations. 
The Peshvva was supreme in nominal author i ty but Daulat 
Eao Scindhia might be considered r a the r as the Chief 
Sovereign in India than as a Maratha Chief owing al legiance to 
1 
the Peshwa. The Peshwa who had usurped the power of Raja of 
Satara though s t i l l professing to be h i s Chief Minis ter , was 
losing control over the great m i l i t a ry Chiefs such as Scindhia 
and Holkar who were behaving l ike independent t e r r i t o r i a l 
p r inces . The i n s t a b i l i t y of Waratha p o l i t i c s provided ample 
opportunity for B r i t i s h in te rvent ion . 
Baji Rao, the Peshv/a as a r e s u l t of internecine s t r i f e , 
fled to Bassein in 1802 to seek help which Y/ellesley v/as eager 
to give. This won Lord V/ellesley the appreciat ion of 
Castlereagh who v/rote: 
"I congratulate your Lordship on having perfected the 
only great work remaining incomplete towards the pac i f ica t ion 
of India and the establishment of the Br i t i sh dominion in 
2 
t h a t part of the globe". 
1. Nolan, op.cit. p.492 
2. Home Misc., 505 f 62, May 14, 1803 (NAI) 
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Even Mr. Barlow, one of the Directors praised the 
statemenship of Lord V/ellesley. He wrote a note to the 
Governor-General: " I t i s absolutely necessary for the defeat 
of ( the French) designs that no native s ta te should be le f t 
to ex is t in India which i s not upheld by the B r i t i s h power, 
or the p o l i t i c a l conduct of which i s not under i t s absolute 
1 
con t ro l " . 
In the diplomatic t r ansac t ion which followed the t r e a ty 
of Bassein was conceived and executed and the road opened for 
the a t tack on "the French amiy of Hindustan" which the 
Governor General had so long desired. Lord Lake, the 
Commander-in-Chief was ordered to make prepra t ions for war. 
Lord V/ellesley laid down the following objec ts to be a t ta ined 
by force of arms;-
1, The seizure of a l l Scindhia 's possessions between the 
Ganges and the Jumna: in other words, Perron' s"jaidadL' 
2, To take the person of the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam* 
under B r i t i s h pro tec t ion : he was at the time in Per ron ' s 
custody, 
5 , The immediate reduction of forces under the command 
of Perron, 
4 . The formation of a l l i a n c e s v/ith the Rajputs and 
other in fe r io r s t a t e s beyond the Jumna for the purpose of 
1, Hutton, op . c i t , p.90 
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exc lud ing Scindhia from the n o r t h e r n d i s t r i c t s of Hindustan: 
t h e s e s t a t e s v;ere t r i b u t a r y t o Pe r ron . 
1 
5 , The occupa t ion of Bundelkhand. 
I t i s very p l a i n t o see t h a t the o b j e c t i v e of t h e 
coapaign was nothing more or l e s s iiian P e r r o n , " / i thout the 
Frenchman t h e r e would have been no war a t a l l : i t was t h i s 
b r igade whicli gave Scindhia confidence t o r e s i s t ard the 
B r i t i s h Government t h e i n c e n t i v e t o a t t a c k . As w i t n e s s t h e 
Governor -Genera l ' s note on the sub j e c t : - " M . P e r r o n ' s f o r c e s 
a re s a i d t o be a t p r e s e n t c o l l e c t e d a t Coal (Al igarh) and 
to c o n s i s t of about 8,000 i n f a n t r y and an equal number of 
c a v a l r y . These r e f e r t o the l o c a l a t Coel (Al iga rh ) on ly , 
f o r i n Lord " / e l l e s l e y ' s "His to ry of the Mahra t ta War" S i n d h i a ' s 
army r e g u l a r and i r r e g u l a r , i n June , 1803 was es t imated as 
fol lov;s : 
Hame & D e s c r i p t i o n of the llo. of T.o. of Fo. of 
Brigr.de B a t t a l i o n s men Guns 
1 s t Brigade,M.Louis Bourquin 8 7,000 50 
2nd Brigade jM.Hessing 7 5,600 50 
3rd Brigade,M.Pohlman 8 6,000 80 
4th Brigade,M.Dudrenec 7 5,000 70 
5 th Brigade,M.Dudrenec 7 4,000 
Corps under M.Dupont 4 2,000 20 
Corps under Major Brownrigg 5 2,250 30 
Corps under Begum Somru 4 2,400 20 
Brigade under Late P i l o z e 6 3,000 60 
Brigade under Arabaji I n g l i a 16 6,400 84 
Grand Total:72 43,650 464 
1. P o l i t i c a l l e t t e r t o t h e Court of D i r e c t o r s , J u l y 25 
1803 (NAT) 
2 . Compton, o p . c i t . p.293 
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That force in t h i s estimate i s exclusive of the 
troops employed in gar r i sons , of i r r egu la r infantry Mewattis 
and o thers , the number of vhich i s considerahle. 
Lord Wellesley wrote to Lord Lake: "I wish you to 
understand tha t I consider the reduction of Scindhia' s 
power in the North-west f r on t i e r of Hindustan to he an 
important object in proport ion to the probabi l i ty of a 
2 
v/ar v/ith Prance". 
He fur ther wrote in a despatch t o the Commander-in-Chief, 
Lord Lake in which the following passage occurs : -
The defeat of Perron i s ce r ta in ly the f i r s t - o b j e c t 
of the compaign. The Commander-in-Chief w i l l consider 
what advantage can be derived from any negotiat ions with 
Perron ov Hessing (for Agra). My opinion i s tha t i t might 
be dangerous to attempt any negot ia t ion with any of Scindhia 's 
o f f icers u n t i l we sha l l be masters of the f i e ld The 
Rajput and Jaut Rajahas are disgusted with Mahratta r u l e , 
but t h e i r dread of Perron* n power exceeds t h e i r v/ish t o be 
re l ieved and the same observation appl ies to the Sikh 
Chief "^ 
In n secret despatch to Lord Castlereagh, the 
Governor-General wrote: "The s t a te of preparat ion required 
1. Ibid 
2. Martin, o p . c i t . , V o l . I l l , p.183 
3 . Governor-General to Lord Lake, July 18,1803 (KAI) 
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by t h e p o s i t i o n s t r e n g t h of o c i n d h i a ' s Jj'rench Corps, under 
the Command of M. P e r r o n , has a l r eady compelled me t o 
•J 
restore the native corps to the war estahlishment". 
Lord V/ellesley further explained his opinion: 
"The regular infantry in the service of Scindhia, 
under the Command of Euiopean Officers, is supported by funds 
derivable almort exclusively from the territorial possessions 
of the Chief, situated between the Jumna and the Ganges, and 
the mountains of Kamaon. A considerable portion, if not the 
whole, of the territory has been assigned to M.Perron, a 
French Officer v/ho has succeeded M. de Boigne (Sic) in the 
Chief Command of Scindia's regular infantry. M.Perron has 
formed his territory into an independent state, of which 
Scindia's regular infantry may justly be termed, the national 
army. The inhabitants of the districts comprehended in 
M. Perron's Jaghir, consider that officer as their immediate 
sovereign, while the troops supported from the revenues of 
the country regard M.Perron as the immediate executive 
authority from which the army is to receive orders, subsistence, 
and pay. Poscessing such means, M. Perron dictates with 
the authority of a sovereign state of a superior rank, and 
with the vigour of efficient military power, to the petty 
states occupying the countries to the southward of the Jumna 
1. Political letter to the Court of Directors, July 25, 
1803 (NAI) 
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and by the terror of his name and arms holds in abject 
submission the Rajput States of Jeypore and Jodpur, together 
?/ith the Jhauts and the state of Gohud, extending his 
influence even to 3undelkhand and to the country occupied 
by the Sikhs. Scindia retains no efficient control over 
M. Perron, or over his regulfir troops. Various instances 
must be familiar to your Execellency's knowledge in which 
M. Perron has either openly disobeyed of systematically 
evaded the orders of Scindia, especially in the late crisis 
of that Chief's affairs. M. Perron has for some time past 
manifested a systematic disposition to remove all British 
subjects from the command of Scindia*s regular infantry, 
and to introduce French officers under his own immediate 
patronage. M. Perron is supposed to have amassed a consider-
able fortune and your Excellency is intimately acquainted 
with his anxious desire to retire to Europe and to dispose 
of his actual conmiand, and of his territorial possessions 
to some perfjon of the French nation. To these consideration 
it is important to add that M.Perron is in possession of the 
person of the unfortunate Emperor, Shah Allum and consequently 
is master of the nominal authority of that unhappy prince, 
and therefore, raaytransfer this valuable possession with his 
property of any other description, to any French adventurer 
or officer who may be enabled to complete such a purchase. 
Thus the coincidence of various extraordinary and 
uncontrollable accidents and the weakness of Scindia's 
personal character, have contributed to found an Independent 
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French State ns the mor,t vulnerable par t of the Compainy'r. 
f r o n t i e r . Under the influence of a succession of French 
adventurers , t h i s s t a t e must be exposed to the in t r igue 
of the French in India , and even to the ambition and hos t i l e 
s p i r i t of the person v/ho now ru l e s the French nat ion. ITor 
could an instrument of des t ruc t ion more sk i l fu l l y adapted to 
wound the hear t of the Br i t i sh nat ion be presented to the 
v indic t ive hand of the F i r s t Consul of France. This French 
s t a t e ac tual ly holds possession of the person and nominal 
au thor i ty of the Mogul, maintains the most army of regular 
nat ive infantry and the most pov/erful a r t i l l a r y ex i s t ing in 
IndiA with the exception of the Company's t roops and exercises 
a considerable au thor i ty over the neighbouring s t a t e s , from 
the banks of the Indus to the confluence of the Ganges and 
Jumna. In the present c r i s i s when every circumstance 
announces the probabi l i ty of a renewal of the war with Prance, 
and urges the necess i ty of r e s o r t i n g to every prac t icable 
measure of precaution and secur i ty , the safety of the Briti 'sh 
dominions requ i res the reduction of M. Per ron ' s m i l i t a ry 
resources and power, independantly of any question which 
1 
might exist between Scindia and the British Govt." 
Lord Wellesly was also conscious of the unique position 
of the Emperor and feared that "Shah Alam might form a dangerous 
1. Governor General to Lord Lake, July 27, 1803 (NAI) 
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instrument in the handt; of any Htate possessing sufficient 
power, energy and judgement to employ it in prosecuting views 
1 
of aggrandifiement and ambition". 
In persuance of this policy, the British Governaent 
offered "protection to the Mughal Emperor while the v/ar was in 
2 progress". 
The Emperor was assured "every demonstration of respect 
3 
and every degree of attention" and an adequate provision for 
the support and maintenance of the royal household. Shah Alam 
4 
was "favouralDly disposed towards this offer". He was however 
firmly under the control of Perron and he was stated to have 
expressed his intention of "taking the field against the 
British".^ 
Moreover the Trea ty of Basse in was not approved by 
Sc indhia . According t o t h i s t r e a t y t h e Peshwa, v/ith t h e 
B r i t i s h suppor t , was t o be r e s t o r e d t o Poona i n 1803. Sfcindhia, 
however was unwi l l ing t o give the B r i t i s h so much inf luence 
t h e r e . " On the o the r hand, t he i n d i c a t i o n of French in f luence 
1. Mar t in , o p . c i t . Vol. IV, p.397 
2 . Governor-General t o Shah Alam, Ju ly 27 , 1803 (FAI) 
3 . This communication was made through Syed Reza Khan, who 
was the agent of t h e Resident wi th Scindhia a t the Court 
of De lh i . Colonel Co l l i n s was then the Res iden t wi th 
Scindhia . 
Lord Lake t o Governor-General , August 8,1803 (NAI) 
4 . Shah Alam t o Governor-General , August 12., 1803 (NAI) 
5 . Lord Lake t o Governor-General , September 1,1803 (llAI) 
6 . New Cambridge, o p . c i t . p .554 
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at the Court of Scindhia, provided V/ellesley with ample 
1 
justification for intervention. 
He v/as at war with Scindhia by August 1303. Lord lake 
set out from Kanpur and reached the gates of Aligarh. The 
position, Perron had taken up, was a strong one and favourable 
for defence, the front being covered by an extensive swamp 
which was unfordable in any parts whilst his right flank was 
protected by the fortress of Aligarh and his left drived 
3 
considerable advantage from the nature of ground. 
No sooner had General Lake fired a few rounds than 
Perron' s force turned and fled av/ay. Perron himself retreated 
to Agra where his family and his pjnassed wealth in precious 
stones and jewels had been kept. The following day, ^ Oth 
August, General Lake sent a summons to Colonel Pedron to 
surrender Aligarh. Pedron was not disinclined to listen to 
terms but he simultaneously received a letter from Perron 
4 
who wrote:-
"To Colonel Pedron" 
Sir, - "You v/ill have received the answer you are to make to 
the propositions of General Lake, I never could have believed 
that for an instant you could have thought of capitulation. 
"Remember you are a Frenchman, and let no action of 
yours tarnish the high character of the Nation. 
"I hope in a few days to send back the English 
commander as fast or faster, than he came. Make yourself 
perfectly easy on the subject. Either the Emperor's 
1. Political letter from Goveral General to Colonel Collins 
July, 1803 quoted in 
Torrens, Empire in Asia 1979, p.189 
2. See the map. 
3. Gompton, op.cit. pp. 300-01 
4. Quoted in Gompton, op.cit. p.302 
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army or the army of G-eneral Lake shall find a grave before 
the fort of Alyghur, Do your duty; and defend the fort 
while one stone remains upon another, 
"Once more remember your nation. The eyes of millions 
are fixed upon you. 
"I am, etc. 
"C. PERROF'. 
General Lake finding his summons disregarded, and 
his terras refused, assaulted Aligarh on 4-th September, 1803. 
In the course of an hour, the British had made themselves 
masters of a fortress, long deemed impregnable. The total 
British loss, killed and wounded was 223, that of the garrison 
killed alone not so much by the sword of the assailants as by 
2 
desperate attempts to escape, exceeded 2000. Pedron was taken 
a prisoner and sent back to France. 
On 7th September Perron withdrew from the service of 
Scindhia and was imparted a safe passage to Chandernagore. 
Now Wellesley turned his attention towards Delhi where the 
Mughal Emperor was under the protection of French. 
Bourquin, the successor to Perron, offered a feeble 
resistance to Lord Lake at Delhi. He captured Delhi, the 
3 
Mughal Capital . The defeat put an end to the French 
machinations a t the Mughal Court. 
1. See illustration, 
2. Beveridge, o p . c i t . p.760. 
3. The loss of the British Killed and wounded was 409, that 
of the enemy was roughly estimated at 3000 on September 11, 
1803. Ibid. p.761. 
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Kow the British became the masters at Delhi. Shah Alain 
was eager to avail of the protection, earlier offered by them. 
The Governor-General considered the emancipation of the Emperor 
from the clutches of the Marathas, an important result of the 
war. He wrote to Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor: "Among the 
inestimable benefits resulting from the brilliant victories 
obtained by the British troops over the armies of Daulat Rao 
Scindhia and of Perron, I have derived the most cordial 
satisfaction in accomplishing the deliverance of your Majesty 
and your royal family from the indignities to which your 
Majesty and your household have been subjected by the violence 
injustice and repacity of those who have forgotten the 
reverence due to your royal person and illustrious house*.* 
Prom Delhi Lord Lake set out for Agra to smash the French 
battalion, stationed there. Dudrenec, the French Commandant 
went over to the Engli^ side before the beginning of battle. 
Consequently the French force surrendered tamely. Agra was 
beseiged and captured.'" Thus the British did away with the » 
French influence in the Delhi-Agra tract, with ease. 
1. Martin, op.cit. Vol. IV p.372 
2. On 12th October about 2500 men surrendered. 7/ithin the fort 
were found tumbrils laden with treasure to the amount of 
22 lakhs (£222,000), together with I64 pieces of ordnance, 
76 of them brass and large quantities of ammunition and stores. 
Among the ordnance was one enormous brass gun v^ hich for 
magnitude and beauty stands unrivalled. Its length was 14 feet 
2 inches, its calibre 23 inches,the weight of its whole body 
96,600 lbs or little above 38 tons(See its illustration) 
General Lake meant to transport it to 
Calcutta and thence to England, but it proved too heavy 
for the raft, on which it was placed and sunk in the river. 
Beveridge, op.cit. p.764 
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1 
In the f i na l b a t t l e a t Laswari, Scindhia 's seventeenth 
b a t t a l i o n of French t ra ined infant ry , supported by French 
a r t i l l e r y , sustained a crushing defeat on November 1,1803. 
The roBult of the act ion v;as never in doubt as nearly 
a l l the senior French Officers of the Scindhian army led by 
Perron^had e a r l i e r deserted t h e i r master, leaving the command 
3 
in the hands of in fe r io r and incompetent men. With the decline 
in the power of Scindhia, a l l French machinations in India 
petered out, The French t e r r i t o r i a l possessions were destroyed 
and the Br i t i sh influence was es tabl ished in the North. 
1 . See the i l l u s t r a t i o n . 
2. The Br i t i sh loss amounted to about 800 but the v ic tory 
though dearly purchased, was most complete except the 
2000 pr i soners , the whole of enemy's ba t t a l i ons to the 
amount of a t l e a s t 7000 men lay dead on the b a t t l e 
f i e l d . Most of the cavalry shared the same f a t e . 
Beveridge, o p . c i t . . p.767. 
5. Lord Lake to the Governor-General, November 2, 1803 (NAI) 
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As a r e s u l t of the Treaty, Napoleon converted the Russian 
1 Emperor from an enemy into an a l l y of Prance. This enabled 
the French Emperor to secure the act ive co l l a to ra t ion of 
Russia in expell ing the Br i t i sh from India. 
Consequently the Francopnobia dominated the foreign 
office of England and the imagination of the Br i t i sh o f f i c i a l s 
at the helm of a f fa i r s in Ind ia . Lord Minto, the Governor-
General devoted greater a t t e n t i o n to foreign pol icy. He gave 
effect to what had already been i n i t i a t e d by Lord V/ellesley. 
In the p a s t , Lord '//ellesley had sent embassies to Pers ia and 
2 
even spread in t r igues in Sindh and the Punjab. 
Captain T.'Ialcolra was sent to Pers ia and had the task 
of involving the Shah of Pers ia in h i s favour, so as to check 
3 
the French th rea t through the Punjab and Sindh. However, 
the Treaty of T i l s i t upset the plans of the B r i t i s h who feared 
a combined Russian and French a t tack upon India. The Br i t i sh 
stood alarmed and caut ious. Napoleon was determined to 
annih i la te the B r i t i s h Empire by a drive into India with the 
help of the Russian Cossacks. He f e l t tha t i t would be eas ier 
1. Fischer , H.A.L. , ^.'tudies in Napoleonic Statesmanship, Germany, 
1903, pp. U4-45 
2. Kastury, N., History of Br i t i sh occupation, undated pp. 149-50 
3 . Po t t ingcr , H., Travels in Beloochistan and Scinde, 1816,p. 4 
4. Kaye, Lives of Indian Officers , Vol I , 1883, p.169 and 
Vol IV, 1883 p . 41 . 
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for him to t ranspor t an army from Par i s to Delhi than from 
Boulogne to Falkestone. 
French th rea t to Br i t i sh i n t e r e s t s , appears t o have been 
g rea t ly exaggerated, yet the effect of such a s t a t e of mind 
2 had a powerful influence on B r i t i s h statesmen. 
I t was evident from the anti-FrencH decisions taken 
by the B r i t i s h a t tha t time." 
Lord Minto, the successor of Sir Barlow, was also 
overtaken by the dreadful Francophobia. A couple of months 
after, h i s advent, he received information about General 
Gardane's a n t i - B r i t i s h a c t i v i t i e s in Pers ia and the establishment 
of French predominance, in the Councils of Tehran. This was 
considered highly in imical to the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s in India . 
Lord Minto was apprehensive tha t France would invade India 
through Pers ia ; and tha t she had already made considerable 
4 progress in the furtherance of tha t p ro jec t . 
Jjord Minto also believed tha t so long as Prance would 
remain engaged in the cont inenta l war, she would not be in a 
posi t ion to implement her intended pro jec t . But in the event 
1. "I de t e s t the English" said Alexander, embracing Napoleon 
"as much as you do and I w i l l uphold you in anything, you, 
attempt them". ' I n tha t case ' Napoleon r ep l i ed , "Peace i s 
concluded," 
Williams, Henry Smith, The Piistorians ' History of the V/orld, 
Vol XIII, 1951 , p. 562. 
2. Marr io t t , J.A.R. , The Eastern Question, 1956, p. 185. 
3 . Secret l e t t e r to the Court of Di rec tors , February 9,18Q8(NAI) 
4 . Marr io t t , ox^.cit . , pp. 203-4-
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of the continued submission of the subjugated po\/ers of Europe, 
the French troops would be free for mi l i t a ry adventures in India 
which might not be beyond the tjcope, energy, a b i l i t y ani 
perseverance of the French Emperor. 
The French were desirous of u t i l i s i n g the neighbours 
of India in the Pers ian Gulf as a base for smashing B r i t i s h 
1 power in India and es tab l i sh ing French influence instead. 
Therefore, in order to a l iena te Pers ia from the influence 
of Prance, Lord riinto decided to despatch a mission with f u l l 
powers to negotiate with Pers ia . A mission in whoce t a l e n t s , 
Zeal and a b i l i t y , he could repose confidence to perform such 
2 
a de l i ca t e and important task. 
The East India Company au tho r i t i e s in london had 
received information about the disputes between the Ameers 
of Sindh and Afghanistan, and the despatch of Vaket^ls by the 
former to Shah of Persia for scelcing h is help ag.'iin.'t the ru le r 
3 
of Kabul, and promising to pay t r i bu t e s to him' on tyie attainment 
of freedom from the Afghan Yoke. The French agents in Pers ia 
took advantage of the pretu?nee of the Vakeels of Sindh. 
They u t i l i zed the opportunity and t r i e d to secure 
the concurrence of the Sindh government for the admission 
of French ships into i t s port's. The Government of India was 
1. Secret l e t t e r to the Court of Directors^ebrary 9,1808(1IAI) 
2. Minute of Lord Vir)to,JiimacyX), 1808. F.D. , Secret and 
Separatedaruax-y30, 1808, cbna 1. (NAI) 
3 . Secret l e t t e r to the Couft of Di rec to r s , March 31 , 1P08(TTAI) 
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under the impression that the talks between the French and 
Eindh were under way to reach an agreement. 
These diplomatic negotiations in Persia further 
alarmed the British in India and convinced them about the 
French invasion on India. These developments made the British 
2 
officials uneasy. The danger seemed real to them. The 
British could not countenance the idea of French ships 
using the ports of Slndh. It posed a potential and perpetual 
threat to British interests in India. The British were 
baffled by the French designs which were more imaginary than 
real. 
Lord Minto immediately took some urgent steps to 
secure British Interests. He was not prepared to give any 
foothold to the French in Sindh which might be used as a 
springboard to dislodge the British from India. He sought 
to prevent the assistance of any Indian state to further 
the French designs.'^  With this end in view, he attempted to* 
renew friendly relations v;ith the Sindh in order to thv/art 
the French from taking the alleged concessions which might 
give a foothold to them on the north extremity of India and a 
jumping ground for implementing their proposed invasion of 
4 British India. 
1. Secret letter to the Court of Directore,March 31, 1803(NAI) 
2. Secret letter to the Court of Directors, April 18,1808(NAI) 
3. Secret letter to the Court of Directors, March 31 , 1808(NAI) 
4. Ibid. 
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The series of French alliances from Persia to Sindh was 
the most disturbing factor, fraught with most dangerous 
consequences for British shipping and commerce, and to their 
growing political hegemony in Korth India. 
To give effect to his determination, he despatched 
a confidential emissary to the Ameers of Sindh, with definite 
guidelines to ascertain the real nature and extent of the 
negotiations between the French and the Government of Sindh. 
Lord Minto thought that It would be an effective 
means to obtain authentic information of the nature, extent 
and progress of the French schemes in the North India, ranging 
from the Kashmir to the Punjab. Lord Minto in order to meet 
any unforseen eventuality even ordered for military 
2 preparedness. 
Minto v/as guided by the assumption that a French expedi-
tionary force towards the confines of North India was imminent. 
Therefore, political expediency demanded to meet the impending 
3 
danger with prudence and precaution. 
In England the Franco-Russian coalition was viewed as a 
great and imminent danger to the frontiers of India. 
Therefore, under Lord Minto the policy of counter acting 
1. Secret letter to the Court of Directors, April 18, 1808.(NAT) 
2. Ibid 
5. Secret letters to the Court of Directors, March 31, 1808(NAI) 
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the Napoleonic t h r e a t s and of providing a b a r r i e r against 
the threatened French advanoeinent through the Punjab and Sindh, 
was fur ther developed. 
The Br i t i sh possessions in East were an object of 
envy and jealousy to the French. The acknowledged naval 
super ior i ty of England rendered i t impossible t o s t r ike a 
blov/ a t her by sea. The defeat of Uapoleon a t Trafalgar was 
the pointer in th i s d i r ec t ion . At the same time the r e s u l t 
of the recent compaigns in Europe rendered i t l ike ly that France 
might make an attempt against the Br i t i sh in India by land. 
The B r i t i s h could not t he re fo re , remain ind i f fe ren t to French 
3 designs. 
The Br i t i sh had already es tabl ished t h e i r t r a d i i ^ 
monopoly on the East . I t i s an irony of h i s to ry tha t i t was 
the French r i va l ry which accelerated the progress of Br i t i sh 
conq.ue8ts in the eas te rn world. 
Commercially also Napoleon's economic war with 
England was a l so responsible for the acce lera t ion of econoruic 
1. Secret l e t t e r to the Court of Direc tors ,Apr i l 18,1808(MI) 
2. Lord Metcalfe held i8ad3jr"our s i tua t ion in India had always 
been precar ious . I t i s s t i l l precarious not l e s s so perhaps 
a t the present moment by the fau l t of the system prescribed 
by government a t home than at any former per iod. We are 
s t i l l a handful of-Europeons governing an immense Empire, 
without any f irrahold on the country, having warlike and 
powerful French menace on our f r o n t i e r s and the s p i r i t of 
d isaf fec t ion dormant but rooted universa l ly among our 
subject . " 
Kaye, J.W.,Lord Metcal te , Select ions from Papers,1853 PP.92-93 
3 . Secret l e t t e r to t h e Court of Di rec tors , May 30, 1808 (KAI) 
4 . Ib id . 
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exp lo i t a t ion of India. Therefore, t h e i r Indian possessions 
became very valuable and s ignif icant for them and hence demanded 
grea te r p o l i t i c a l control and extent ion of Br i t i sh power in 
India. The Br i t i sh r e t a l i a t e d ngaint^t the Continental System 
by issuing the Orders-in-council which prohibited the neutra ls 
from trading with por t s from v^ere the Br i t i sh goods were 
excluded. The immediate consequence of t h i s was tha t England 
succeeded in es tab l i sh ing a temporary monopoly over a l l sea 
borne commerce, espac ia l ly of the invaluable t rade with India. 
The Continental System had a devastat ing effect on 
Napoleon's power and reputa t ion in Europe. In enforcing the 
blockade Napoleon over extended borders of h i s influence. 
The occupation of Spain in 1808 to compel the Iber ian Peninsula 
to cloBe i t s portr> to Br i t a in , was a serious mistake; i t 
s t a r t ed the Peninsular \'}av, r e s u l t i n g in a constant dra in on 
French resources.^ 
Although French proposals for the p a r t i t i o n of Turkey 
and a jo in t expedit ion to India had already been made t o the 
Czar, they were probably l i t t l e more than p o l i t i c a l devices 
t o hold on h i s wavering a l leg iance . In spi te of the Erfurt 
meeting between the two Emperors in September, 1808, the 
French hegemony establ ished at T i l s i t , was growing weaker. 
1. Lee, Stephen, J . , Aspects of European History (1789-1980), 
1982, p.32 
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The Spanish risin^^ had caiused n T)i'ofourid change in the 
p o l i t i c a l s i t ua t i on of Eui'ope, much to the disadvantage of 
Prance. Early in 1809 the Governor General in India received 
nev/s about the favourable turn of events to England at the 
Continent, The Governor General f e l t convinced that the 
s i tua t ion required a rev is ion of h i s policy and the arrangements 
e a r l i e r made to face the ear ly designs of ?ronce , had also 
undergone a change. 
Kapoleon's project of a second eastern expedit ion 
a l so collapsed. The Spanish insur rec t ion and the weakening 
of the Prance-Ru.'jsian a l l iance increased Fapoleon's involvement 
in Europe and forced him f ina l ly to turn h i s thoughts away from 
the proposed overland invasion of the Br i t i sh possessions in 
India through the Sindh and Punjab. All apprehensions of 
French armies marching across India through the Northern Irrfia 
using the land route ceased, and the emergence of Great 
B r i t a i n as the v ic tor ious pov/or in Europe changed the en t i r e 
course of the policy of the East India Company towards t h e i r 
2 
French enemy in the eastern world. 
At the commencement of his administration, he was full 
of dread of an impending i'^ rench invasion of India, It haunted 
the imagination of British administration, but by the end of 
1. Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee 
January 20, 1809 (NAT) 
2. Ibid. 
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his tenure France had forfeited all its acquisitions east of 
the Gape. Let us see how it wns achieved by Lord Minto through 
his diplomacy. 
Diplomatic mission 
The North Indian territories of Punjab and Sindh were 
most vulnerable in the eyes of British outhoritics in India 
for any French advance in this region. The Governor General 
Lord Minto wanted to use these two states as buffers in order 
to safeguard the frontiers of the East India Company. In his 
perception, these two states in league with Pi-ance would 
prove very threatening to the interest of the CompaiTy. Therefore, 
Lord Minto did not leave anything for chance. His endeavour 
was to keep the French danger away from the British territories 
and meet it outside their borders. 
Lord Kinto was of the view that rigid neutrality of 
hie predecessor and his purely defensive attitude had proved 
2 
to be ineffective. In the changed scenario he found the 
earlier policy meaningless and unnecessarily risky. 
It was destined to lead the British into a vortex from 
where escape without positive damage to British interests was 
Impossible. Therefore, Lord Minto acted in a fit of 
Francophobia, as well as in a spirit of realism. He despatched 
1. Secret letter to the Court of Directors, April 18, 1808(FAI). 
2. Ibid 
X( Ace No. \ 
missions to Sindh and Punjab lying on the north extremity of 
British India. He decided to create an effective barrier 
against the French inroads in the Punjab and Sindh. This was 
a carefully prepared scheme to counteract French designs in 
the region. 
The Court of Directors and the Foreign Office of 
England had also realised the gravity of the situation and 
concurred with Lord Minto's policy of counteracting the 
French danger to India by taking over the border states into 
greater confidence and incorporating them into a chain of 
definite defensive alliances. 
(a) Metcalfe's Mission to Lahore 
Having obtained the concurrence of White Hall and the 
India House, Lord Minto despatched a political mission to 
Lahore. He selected Charles Metcalf, a very talented official 
possessing abilities of a statesman. He was required mainly 
to counteract the alleged French designs of an attack on India 
by wooing Maharaja Ranjit Singh to an alliance. Metcalfe was 
also instructed to prevent the Sikh Chief from extending his 
2 
territory to the Cis-Sutlej region on French prompting. 
1. Secret letter to the Court of Directors, September 14,1808(NAI) 
2. The' opinion of Kiernan is illuminating, "The negotiations 
with Ranjit Singh were in fact to turn so little on French 
affairs that it might be permissible to suspect Napoleon of 
being in this case a mere red herring and the mission of 
•being sent to initiate a penetration of the Punjab." 
Kiernan, V.G., Metcalfe's Mission to Lahore, 1985, p.5. 
78 
Metcalfe was received at Kasur by Maharaja Ilanjit 
Singh who was however apprehensive and suspicious about the 
motives of this mission. The British emissary stated that the 
friendship which subsisted between him and the British, had 
induced Lord Minto to depute him in order to communicate some 
important intelligence with which the I.Iaharaja's interests 
were materially concerned. 
He told him that the British Government had received 
reliable and authentic reports that the French, v/ho were 
endeavouring to establish themselves in Persia, had planned 
2 the invasion and seizure of Punjab. Therefore, considering 
interests of the British and the Maharaja identical, the 
Governor General of India had commissioned him to negotiate with 
him some arrangements, to meet the French threat as their 
common threat. Several meetings took place, some between 
the envoy and the Maharaja and others between him and the 
Maharaja's principle ministers. Fothing tangible came out as 
serious differences of opinion cropped up betv/een the two parties, 
Maharaja v/anted a clone alliance bet'ween the Lahore Kingdom 
and the British Government, whereas Metcalfe saw in these 
proposals the expansionist designs of the Maharaja. Metcalfe 
remained evasive and unconvincing about them. 
1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, Sept. 23, 1808, P.D. Secret 
and Separate, Oct. 17, 18o8, Cons. 19 (NAI). 
2. Ib id 
3 . Metca l fe t o Edmonstone Sept. 28 , 1808, F.D. Secre t 
and s e p a r a t e , Oct. 17,1808, Conn. 20 ( M I ) . 
4 . Ibid 
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Meanwhile the Sikh Chief Crossed the Sutlej and 
encamped at Khai, a village about 12 miles inland. Tietcalfe 
followed him and had a raeetinj'; with him there, in which 
again there was no progress oi" any appreciable advance. On 
October 4, 1808, the Sikh Chief advanced from Khai to T?aridkot 
diGregarding the protests of the British envoy who stated 
that the aim of his mission was to negotiate a settlement 
and not to accompany him on his military compaigns. Therefore, 
Metcalfe submitted the draft proposals of the proposed treaty. 
Its provisions envisaged firstly, a defensive alliance between 
the British India and the Punjab against Prance in the event 
of a Napoleonic invasion, secondly free passage and assistance 
to the British army should it be necessary to meet the enemy 
o 
at the Indus or beyond.'' Draft Treaty contemplated an alliance 
only against the Prench invasion which was the princioal 
3 
concern of Lord r.Iinto. 
On the other hand, Ranjit Singh could clearly see 
through the British game of expansion and the French threat 
was merely a pretext and nothing more. Therefore, Maharaja 
Ranjit Singh neither loved it nor hated it; he rather feared 
the East India Compare/ as a formidable power. He v/as afraid 
1. MatCalfe to Edmonstone, Oct.5, 1809 P.D. Secret and 
separate, Oct.31 , 1808, Cons 2.(NAI) 
2. Plan of a Treaty transmitted by Metcalfe on Oct.4,1808 
F.D. Secret and separate, Nov. 14,1808, Cons,15(MI) 
3 . Ib id 
4-. R a n j i t Singh i s sa id t o have once remarked. " I might purhaps 
d r ive the B r i t i s h ( U n g r e z Bahadur) a s f a r as Allyghur but shouldi 
be d r i v e n back a c r o s s the S u t l e j and ou t of my Eir-gdom" 
McGregor,History of the Sikh.Vol. 11 ,1846 ,p . 35. 
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of i t s presence on h i s "bordei's. He c lear ly understood 
t h a t i t was preposterous to c a l l the assurances and proposals 
of Metcalfe as defensive a l l i ance against Prance.. Further 
i t was absurd t o think that i t was the Punjab and not 
2 B r i t i s h India which would benefi t by t h i s a l l i a n c e . 
Ranji t Singh's percept ion was tha t i t was London and 
not Lahore, which was the enemy of France.-^ He was convinced 
about the B r i t i s h move to rope him in the i r a l l i a n c e . Therefore, 
for h i s agreeing the Br i t i sh must pay for i t and concede t o 
h i s proposals. He impressed up on the Br i t i sh to accept h i s 
point of view, and in the meanwhile endeavoured to capture 
as much of the Cis-Sut lej t e r r i t o r y as he could, pending 
4 
the negot ia t ions . 
Metcalfe 's assurances did not i n t e r e s t Ranjit Singh. 
Considering i t as t h e most opportune moment to ex t rac t 
concessions from t h e East India Company, the Lahore Chief 
submitted h i s own draf t of a Treaty on October 8,1808, 
cons is t ing of three prepos i t ions ; f i r s t l y , asking for Br i t i sh 
non-interference in h i s disputes with the Kabul regime. 
1. Khushwant Singh, Ranji t Singh, 1962, p. 76. 
2. "All the advantages accrue to the B r i t i s h for the 
r e a l object of a French invasion would be the B r i t i s h 
and not the SikW said Bnav/ani Das, the minister 
of Ranjit Singh 'Ko' answered Metcalfe emphatically 
"You do not know the French as I do. The French 
w i l l destroy your independence". Ibid p. 83. 
5. Metcalte to Edmonstone, Oct 5 , 1808, F.D. Secret and 
separate , Oct .51, 18U8, Cons. 2 (NAI) 
4. Khuswant Singh, o p . c i t . p.76 
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secondly, a perpetual a l l i ance between the Lahore Kingdom 
and the Br i t i sh and t h i r d l y , recogni t ion of h is sovereignty 
over the whole Sikh t e r r i t o r y . 
Ranjit Singh knew very well that the B r i t i s h were 
approaching him under the French threat and they desired h i s 
help more than he r ea l l y needed the Br i t i sh fr iendship in 
defending the northern borders . Metcalfe could not give 
any promise to Kanjit Singh regarding the connections with 
2 Kabul or the Cis -Sut le j . Therefore, Kanjit Singh took 
f u l l advantage of the Br i t i sh involvement in Europe at a 
time when the Napoleonic power was at i t s zeni th . 
The cont inenta l Europe was a source of v/orry to the 
B r i t i s h . Napoleon was casting h i s covetous eyes on the 
B r i t i s h possessions in India. 
The Asiat ic conq.uest was a dominant par t of the 
Napoleonic grand design and J.anjit Singh was determined t c 
embark upon enlarging h i s au thor i ty in the Cie-Sut le j area 
which was divided into ne t ty independent Sikh P r i n c i p a l i t i e s . 
The most important of them were P a t i a l a , J ind , Nabha, Kai tha l , 
Ladv/a, Khulsia and Thanesar, Ranjit Singh, having known 
the B r i t i s h involvement in Europe, annexed Ambala and brought 
1. Proposal delivered by Kanjit Sir^h to Metcalfe on 
Oct .8 , 1808, P.D, secret and separate , Nov.14,1808, 
Cons. 2. (NAI) 
2. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, Oct.26, 1808, P.D. Secret 
and separa te , Nov. 14, 1808, Cons. 20 (NAI). 
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Mehtab Singh, the Chief of Thanesar to submission. The 
Raja of Pnt ia la exchanged turbans with the Tiaharaja and 
1 
thus agreed to be fr iendly with him. At Shahaoad, the 
Chiefs of Jagadhri , Burea, and Radavvar attended the Maharaja 
2 
and offered nazars to him accordin/^ to t h e i r means. 
Under these circumstances, Lord Minto sent a strong 
despatch of protes t to the Maharaja, disapproving of h i s 
policy to susjugate the Cis-Sut le j t e r r i t o r i e s . He 
vehemently attacked the Maharaja's policy of expansion and 
advanced B r i t i s h claims on the s t a t e s of tha t region. Lord 
Minto explained h i s pos i t ion t o Ranjit Singh tha t by the 
issue of a war with the Marathas during the re ign of Lord 
Wellesley, the Br i t i sh Goverrjment became possessed of the 
power and r i g h t s in the north of Hindustan. At that t ime, 
the Maharaja did not advance h i s claim on tha t region. I t 
was also explained that even in the early phase of the 
Br i t i sh contact with Ranjit Singh, a communication was 
received from him by Lord Lake, proposing to f ix the Sutle*j 
as the eas tern border of the Lahore Kingdom. 
Lord Minto demonstrated t h i s , in order t o send a 
s ignal tha t Ranjit Sir^h was aware of the dependence of 
Cis-Sut le j region, on the power Paramount, north of Hindustan, 
a t tha t time. 
1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone , Kov.7 ,1808,P.D.Secret and 
separate, Kov. 29 , 1808, Cons.6(FAI) 
2. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, Nov.2u ,1808,F.D. Secret and 
separate , Dec.5 ,1808,Cons.8 (HAI) 
J>. Note transmitted by Envoy to the Maharaja, Dec. 12,1808, 
F.D. ,Secret Cons. Jan. 2,18u9 ,Cons.94(NAI) 
A. Ibid 
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The contention of Lord Minto was that in accordance 
with the et.tablished cuntom, thore Chiefs were and would 
remain under the protection of the British who were the 
successors of the T'arathas in that region. This claim 
appeared to be a very far fetched and unsupported by any 
legal or customary practices. Lord Minto refused to accept 
the claim of Ranjit Singh over any Cis-Sutlej principality. 
Instead, he advised tie Maharaja to return all the places 
subjugated by him to their former possessors and confine 
1 
his armed forces to the right bank of the river Sutlej. 
So the extention of the Lahore Kingdom accross 
the Sutlej was not acceptable to Lord Minto. If conceded, 
Lord Minto believed the British territory would be 
cotermir.us with that of K'anjit Singh and would thereby 
subjrct its northern frontiers exposed to a "chronic state 
2 
of invasion and disturbance". 
The advice of Governor General was not liked by 
Ranjit Singh and he was not prepared to accept it. 
For some time, therefore, he felt greatly agitated and 
v/as in a state of indecision. 
There was a meeting between the Maharaja and Metcalfe 
on December 21, 1808. The British envoy demanded the 
1. Note transmitted by Envoy to Ihe Maljaraja. December 12, 
1808, F.D. Secret. Cons. January 2,1809,Cons.94 (NAI) 
2. Griffin, Lepel H.: The Ra.jas of the Punjab ,1873 ,PP. 118-20. 
3. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 18,1808, E.D, Secret 
Cons. January 30, 1809. Cons. 102 (MAX) 
84 
re tu rn of the t e r r i t o r i e s , annexed by Ranjit Singh. The 
Maharaja, who did not want to be deprived of the opportunity 
to achieve h i s loAS cherished objective of 'Ukh uni ty , f re t ted 
and fumed and even threatened war. Ultimately he r ea l i s ed 
tha t h i s kingdom was unequal to the might Br i t i sh power and 
preferred to calm down. 
On the contrary, the Br i t i sh Government became more 
inf lexible and firm in i t s stand. Changed B r i t i s h a t t i t ude 
and posture was due to Ihe turn of events in Europe. 
Napoleon Bonaparte became entangled in the Peninsular 
war. The Br i t i sh v/ere now no longer apprehensive of 
Uapoleon Bonaparte reaching within s t r i k ing distance of 
2 Ind ia and h i s menace was wearin,??; away. The Governor-General 
decided to send General Ochterlony to take on the turbulent 
Maharaja. Ranjit Singh's long cherished desire 6f welding 
a l l the Sikh misals into a single po l i ty was f rus t ra ted . He 
had to enter in to a fr iendly a l l i ance . The Treaty of 
Amritsar was concluded in 1809 af ter prot racted negotiat ions 
and fixed Sut le j as the eas tern most boundary of Panj i t Singh's 
Kingdom. 
1. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 22,1808,P.D. Secret 
Cons. January J>0, Cons 105 (NAI) 
2. Narrain & Dutta, A Comprehensive History of India 
Vol XI 1985, p.391. 
3. Ochterlony received fresh intructions 
"The reduction or subversion of the power of that Chieftain 
(Ranjit Singh) which under other circumstances was 
considered an event highly desirable and expected to be 
a probable consequence though not settled purpose, of 
the approximation of our troops to the frontier of the Punjab 
is no longer of the same importance to our interests" 
January 30, 1809 (MI) 
4-. Por full details^ see Appendix C. 
85 
I t committed the Br i t i sh to have no concern with the 
t e r r i t o r i e s and subjects of the Raja to the northward of 
the r iver Sut le j ;'nd forced iLanjit Singh to forego a l l 
h i s recent conquests and to r e t a i n in h i s possessions no 
more troops than were absolutely e s sen t i a l for police purpose, 
The Treaty of Amritsar marked the beginning of the northward 
drive of B r i t i s h influence and mi l i t a ry power beyond the 
r ive r Juhtna which could not be f i n a l l y completed t i l l the 
death of Saharaja r.ar.jit Singh. 
Br i t i sh diplomacy v/as at i t s be s t . The Br i t i sh 
rea l i sed that under the guise of French menace, the turbulent 
Maharaja was tamed and with h i s amity, friendship and 
co-operat ion they would be able to face any foreign invasion 
1 
from the North. So the Sikh monarchy had been described as 
"Napoleonic in the suddenness of i t s r i s e , the b r i l l i a n c y 
2 
of its success and the completeness of its overthrow". 
The British achieved important landmarks for -ftie * 
East India Company. They were the outcome of fear and of a 
probable French drive towards India by the overland route, 
hereafter the Punjab, under Maharaja Ranjit Singh remained 
a buffer state between British India and territories beyond 
the geographical frontier of North India. The East India 
1. Metcalfe 's correspondence No.36, November 8,1809 (NAI) 
2. Griff in , Tir Lepel, a an j i t Singh. Rulers of India 
Series , 1898, pp. 91-92 
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Company TDecame an unchallenged power-paramount in the vast 
subcontinent. 
(b) Smith's Mission to Sin^h 
After Lahore, Lord Minto made Sindh, a ta rget of h i s 
expansionist pol icy. He rea l i sed the importance ot having 
close f r iendly r e l a t i o n s with the Ameers of Sindh whose 
t e r r i t o r i e s were of immense s t r a t eg i c importance for Br i t i sh 
India. Sindh vvas a maritime s ta te with a-vas t harbour on 
the Arabian sea coast and a large v/ater channel. 
Geographically i t was the nearest port of India to 
Egypt. I t s land f ron t i e r was contiguous to the t r i b a l 
be l t of Baluchistan, across v/hich existed two independent 
kingdoms of Afghanistan and Pe r s i a . The Ameer of Kabul was 
the p o l i t i c a l superior of Sindh v/hile the other one, Pers ia , 
was a t r a d i t i o n a l enemy of Afghanistan and was gradually 
coming under the French influence. 
Napoleon Bonaparte 's r ep resen ta t ive , General Gardane 
v/as ac t ive ly engaged in h i s diplomatic manoeuvres to supplant 
Br i t i sh influence from Pers ia and to br ing i t into the French 
4 
o r b i t . Napoleon had ins t ruc ted h i s envoy to Tehran, General 
1. Lyal l , Sir Alfred, Rise and Expansion of Br i t i sh Dominion 
in India , 1907, p.204 
2. Lambrick, H.T. Sir Charles Napier 'k Sindh,1932, pp.7-8. 
3 . Secret l e t t e r to Court of Di rec tors , M^ay 3 , 1808 (NAI) 
4. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near % Middle East (1833-1914)« 
195b, pp. 78-81. 
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Gardane tha t h i s chief aim should be to form a t r i p l e 
a l l i ance between Prance, Turlce,^ '^  and Persian for the purpo ae 
of opening out a road to India. He also di rected him to 
ascer ta in what co-operation might be expected within the 
country p a r t i c u l a r l y from the llarathas i f India couid be 
reached by a French aririy . 
These geopo l i t i ca l considerat ions and the determination 
to ward off even the remotest p o s s i b i l i t y of ?rench danger t o 
the B r i t i s h Empire in the Eas t , and i t s over-seas t rade on 
which depended the prosper i ty and power of t he Br i t i sh 
nat ion, made i t imperative for the East India Company to court 
"ttifci fr iendship of the Ameers of i-'indh and to e s t ab l i sh a 
strong ba r r i e r against the th rea t of a French invasion on 
1 
the extreme fringe of northern India. 
Captain Seton was deputed as the British envoy to 
the Court of Sindh with definite instructions to establish 
friendly and cordial relations with the Ameers of Sindh "and 
to seek their cooperation against the French advance towards 
the East, He was also instructed to demand the establishment 
of a British Residency and a commercial factory in their 
2 
territory. 
Captain Seton made an offer of the closest co-operation 
1. Ghoksey, R.D. , I.Iountstuart Elphinstone, 1971 
pp. 1'25-26. 
2. Secret l e t t e r t o Court of Di rec tors , May 3 , 
1808 (NAI). 
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of British political interert wi1h the state of Sindh 
and soon entered into a defensive arrangeinent, which 
eventually ended in the execution of a Treaty on July 18, 
1801. 
This Treaty imposed on each party an obligation to 
furnisyi military, at the requisition of the other, without 
ar^ y limitation or condition. Captain ?eton signed this 
Treaty on the understanding that the Ameers of Sindh would 
ask for assistance of British troops only for repelling the 
advance of a French army tov/ards that country and for no 
other purpose. But no specific mention of it was made in 
the Treaty. In doing so he acted in a hurry forgetting the 
obligations that the Treaty imposed upon the British Government 
to furnish its troops to Sindh even for other purposes, such as 
the attempt of the Ameers to resist the claims of the Court 
of Kabul for tribute. 
The British Government feared lest the Court of Kabul 
should misunderstand British motives in Sindh and thus develop 
and strengthen hostile relations v/ith it. 
On account of the Napoleonic threat, Lord Minto did 
not want to antagonise the neighbours of India such as the 
Kabul regime which could have capped the British energy and 
1. Secret letter to Court of Directors, December 7, 1808 
(MI) 
89 
1 
s trength. The Governor Genernl only wanted to keep the 
Punjab and '.indh avay from the probable French influence 
to safeguard the i n t e r e s t s of company. 
The diplomatic conduct of captain Soton could have 
provoked the Kabul regime into waging a war against the 
Br i t i sh in India. This created apprehension in the mind 
of Lord Minto who was already alarmed af te r the execution 
of Treaty of T i l s i t . 
The Calcutta Government, the re fore , disapproved of the 
conduct of Captain Seton and declined t o r a t i f y the 
engagement as i t was l i ke ly to land the East India Company 
into serious p o l i t i c a l controversies on the Northern 
f ron t i e r . 
Seton had not taken note of the other ins t ruc t ions 
given to him. The refusal of the East India Company to 
r a t i f y t h i s engagement", was d i s l iked by the Ameers who did 
not even evince i n t e r e s t t o e s t ab l i sh amicable r e l a t ions* 
with the B r i t i s h Government. 
1. Lord Minto addressed a long and able l e t t e r to 
the Secret Committee in which he d e s c r i e d the 
"impolicy and indeed imprac t i cab i l i ty of 
preserving in the cause of policy adopted two 
years before by h i s predecessor v/ithout incuring 
in very increased degree those very hazards and 
embarrassments which t h i s neut ra l system 
proposed to avoid," December 15, 1808 (NAT) 
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They doubted Br i t i sh motives, and t h e i r minds were 
f i l l e d with anger and suspicion. Instead of forming a 
common cause with the East India Company, they sprang a 
surprise on i t by demanding the r e c a l l of captain Seton. 
After the non- ra t i f ioa t ion of the t r e a t y such a demand was 
quite na tu r a l . 7/ith a view to recover the ground, los t by 
Captain Seton in Sindh and t o accomplish the object ives , 
o r ig ina l ly proposed to him, lord Minto there upon deputed 
Nickolas Hankey Smith as the new Br i t i sh envoy to Sindh. 
2 
He was sent t o annul the t r e a t y . The Br i t i sh mission 
was received well on i t s a r r i va l in Sindh. After the exchange 
of formal cour tes ies , in which the B r i t i s h envoy gave an 
appra i sa l of f r iendly r e l a t i ons between East India Comioany 
and Sindh, he se t t l ed down to the r e a l buss i ress of h i s 
mission. 
In s t r i c t conformity with the ins t ruc t ions of the 
Governor-General, the Br i t i sh envoy showed h i s keenness 
to befriend the Ameers of Sindh. He adopted l eas t offensive 
a t t i t ude towards h i s hosts and apprised them of the views 
3 
of the Br i t i sh Government and the aims of h i s mission. 
He thus t r i e d h i s best to d i spe l from the mind of 
the Ameer, the fear thnt h is government had hos t i l e designs 
1. Edmonstone to N.H. Smith, November 28, 1808,?.D. Secret 
Cons. Oct. 17, 1809, Cons. 16 (IJAI) 
2. Choksey, o p . c i t . pp. 125-26 
3 . Smith to Edmonstone, October 1, 1809, P.D.Secret Cons. 
August 7 , 1812 Cons.5(FAI) 
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in Cvitch and to assure tliem of the best of Br i t i sh inten-
t ions to perpetuate fr iendly r e l a t ions with t h e i r country. 
The assurance of Smith did not go far to convince 
the j^meers of ^.indh and dif;pel the doubts about the Br i t i sh 
a c t i v i t i e s on the borders of t h e i r country, and that the 
despatch of the mission to t h e i r court was not motivated by 
any s i n i s t e r design. Driven by self i n t e r e s t and determined 
to extend the i r sphere of influence in Cutch, the Ameers 
of Sindh proposed a s l igh t modification, contained in a 
2 
new explanatory clause, added to the or ig ina l propoal. 
They proposed to r e t a in f ive-e ighths of the annual revenues 
of Cutcli v/ith them and to offer three-e ighths of i t t o the 
Br i t i sh Government, should i t cooperate with them in the 
subjugation of Cutch. In the event of B r i t i s h d i s i n t e r e s t 
to accede t o t h e i r proposal , they accented tha t the Br i t i sh 
Goverrjuent would not oppose them in t h e i r e f for t s to 
es tab l i sh t h e i r supremacy in Cutch. In t h i s contingency 
alone, they expressed t h e i r wi l l ingness to conclude an agree-
ment of offensive and defensive nature against the French, 
•5 
as oroposed by the Br i t i sh envoy. 
Moreover in re tu rn for j r i t i s h cooperation in the 
subjugation of Cutch^ they promised to allow the re-establiehment 
1. Narrain 4 Dutta op. c i t . p. 295. 
2. Smith to Edmonstone, October 1, 1809, F.D. secret cons. 
August 7, 1812, cons.5 (KAI) 
3 . Smith to Edmonstone, October 1,1809 F.D. Secret Cons. 
August 7, 1812, cons. 5 (JIAI) 
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1 
of a British factory in their territory. These friendly 
proposals were apprecir.ted by Smith but he was more interested 
in preventing the French establishment in Sindh than offering 
2 
the British military help in subjugating Cutch. The Ameers 
of Sindh wanted to take advantage of East India Company's 
concern about the French advance towards India through the 
3 
Punjab and Sindh. 
The negotiations to execute a treaty with Sindh, had 
gone on for some time. Both the sides were adamant in 
extracting as many concessions as they could. The British 
4 
wanted the promise of Ammers to keep away from the French. 
The annexation of Cutch with the help of British was the 
target of Sindh. But this did not bring out an abrupt 
termination of negotions for a friendly alliance with Sindh. 
As a result of protacted negotiations, the Ameers expressed 
their determination to agree to the restoration of British 
commercial relations with their country only on the condition 
of British help to them in Cutch.-' However v/ith regard to * 
the proposal for a permanent British Residency in Sindh, they 
stated that they would accept only a yearly despatch of a 
British envoy to their country provided the British Government 
also agreed to admit a vakil at Bombay on similar terms. 
1. Ibid 
2 . Smith to Edraonstone, August 23," 1809, F.D, s e c r e t Cons. 
October 17, 1809, Cons. 16 (NAI) 
3 . Smith to Edmonstone , October 1 ,18u9 F.D. Secret Cons. 
August 7, 1812, Cons.5 ( M I ) 
4 . Smith to Edmonstone, August 23 , 1809 F.D. Secret Cons. 
October 17,1809 Cons. 16 ( M i ; 
5 . Smith to Edmonstone October 1,1809, F.D. Secre t Cons. 
August 7,1812 Cons. 5 (NAI) 
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At Ins t the protracted discussions brought about 
an agreed set t lement . On August 22, 18u9 the Ameers deputed 
Akhund Muhammad Bucca Khan to propose the B r i t i s h envoy 
the i r decis ion to conclude a Treaty, having i t s basis on 
the p r inc ip le that the f r i e n i s and enemies of one s ta te 
should be the fr iends and enemies of the other . 
Smith accepted the p r inc ip le underlying the proposed 
Treaty and accanpanied t h e Ameer's representa t ive the same 
evening to tha t court where they offered a promissory 
2 
engagement for Smith's concurrence which was agreed to him. 
Consequently, a Treaty of fr iendly a l l i ance comprising 
four c lauses , was signed on August 22, 1809. I t was known 
as Treaty of Hyderabad.^ I t s t i pu l a t ed , f i r s t l y , external 
fr iendship between the Br i t i sh Government and the three 
Ameers of Sindh, Viz, Meer Ghulam Al l , Mir Kureem Ali and 
Meer Murad Al i , secondly, demonstration of the signs of 
enmity on e i the r side against other ; t h i r d l y , mutual despatch 
of Vakils to each others cap i t a l s whenever necessary, without 
any obstruct ion from any side and; four th ly , prevention of 
the establishment of the French in Sindh.^ 
1. Khera, P . r . . B r i t i s h Policy towards Sindh, I941 p.6 
2. Smith to Edraonstone, October 1,1809, P.D. Secret Cons. 
August 7,1812, Cons. 5 (NAT) 
3 . See the anpendix C for f u l l d e t a i l s 
(The Treaty of Hyderabad had four clauses and only 
s ixty eight words) 
4. The word "Tribe" i s used by the Br i t i sh for the French 
possibly to show contempt for them or to impress upon 
the Sindh Ameers tha t the French were a backward t r i b a l 
people and therefore undesirable, 
(luoted in 
Khera, op. c i t . p.6 
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The f i r s t two clauses of t h i s Treaty were mere 
expressions of general f r iendship , the th i rd opened the 
door for future consultfitions, discussions and negotiations 
between the two governments through accredited agents , and 
the l a s t one prevented the admission of ary French t r ibe 
into Sindh. 
This Treaty provided a ba r r i e r against the apprehended 
French invasion of India from the northern s ide , and prevented 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a n t i - B r i t i s h a l l i ance between the French 
and Sindh. All the fears of the Francophobe Br i t i sh mind 
that Sindh might become a centre of French in t r igues and 
conspiracies or a spring board for encroachments in to the 
Br i t i sh t e r r i t o r i e s , disappeared for ever. This provided 
secur i ty to the north f ron t i e r of Br i t i sh India. 
The friendship with Sindh encouraged Lord Minto to 
concentrate on negotiat ions for fr iendly anti-French 
a l l i ances with neighbouring countr ies such as Persia and * 
Afghanistan to safeguard the B r i t i s h possessions in 
2 
north India. 
The Treaty of Hyderabad did not prove very beneficial 
to 1he interests of Tindh. The only gains to them, from 
it were, the establishment of friendly relations with the 
1. Lambrick, op. cit. p. 12 
2. Choksey, op.cit. 91 
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mighty Br i t i sh power in India and t h e i r s a t i s f ac t ion tha t 
they might be freed in future from any unduly aggressive designs 
of the Afghanistan. 
Under the guise of Prancophobia, the Br i t i sh checked 
the south east ward expansion of Sindh in Cutch. The Br i t i sh 
looked upon i t v\?ith disfavour. S t i l l the Ameers considered 
the Treaty of Hyderabad a previlege to have fr iendly r e l a t i o n s 
with 1he Br i t i sh as they were not fu l ly sovereign p r inces . 
The r e l a t i o n s between the Br i t i sh Government and Sindh 
did not develop during the l a t e r da '^-s of Lord Minto's 
administrat ion in India. The r e a l i z a t i o n , tha t Napoleon was 
enmeshed in dynast ic intrigue.s and unable to ex t r i ca te himself 
from the Iber ian Peninsula, soon retui-ned the a f f a i r s of 
Sindh to t h e i r origirail obf^ciirity. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The news of the revolut ion in Prance s t i r r e d the 
French colonies in India; Chandernagore, in pa r t i cu l a r 
adopted a new cons t i tu t ion . Insp i t e of this,"Equality and 
F r a t e r n i t y was denied to Indians , Moreover, the differences 
between the o f f i c i a l s of I s l e of Prance, Pondicherry and 
Chandernagore were more of persona l i ty clashes r a the r than 
any change in t h e i r po l i c i e s and a t t i t u d e . 
The French in North India had been described by the 
India House, as agents of France, pursuing nat ional i n t e r e s t 
and providing a plausible 'hope for the establishment of 
French p o l i t i c a l influence over a large pa r t of India. 
Contemporary English opinion stood alarmed by the s t r ik ing 
successes of French arms in Europe and the i n t r e p i d i t y of 
Napoleon Bonaparte magnified the t h r e a t t o English power in 
India . 
The l e t t e r s and despatches of Wellesley shav c lear ly 
the extent of anxiety f e l t by the B r i t i s h in India over the 
presence of large French t ra ined armies. They were in a 
pos i t ion to cooperate with ary expeditionary force that 
might be sent from France. The causes for the second 
Anglo-Maratha war, were inherent in the English desire to 
el iminate the French menace from India. 
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In fact the French threa t had r a the r been exaggerated 
by the B r i t i s h , Equally the p o l i t i c a l ro le of the French 
adventurers had also been magnified to a great ex tent . The 
careers of French adventurers c lea r ly showed tha t t h e i r sole 
object ive was t o amass pr ivate fortunes as fas t as they could 
and on the i r r e tu rn to Europe, enjoy t h e i r wealth. Some of 
them did demonstrate Jacobinical lean ings , but none of them 
had any def in i te p o l i t i c a l objective of es tab l i sh ing French 
power in India , e i t he r by t he i r own resources or in co-operation 
wi-tii any expeditionary force tha t might be sent from France, 
There i s nothing to show that these adventurers hai any 
contact or influence with the au tho r i t i e s of the I s le of Prance 
or with the Government of France. Down to the Treaty of 
Amiens there was, of course, no question of France sending 
an expeditionary force to India . But the correspondence of 
Napoleon during the Egyptian expedition and the ins t ruc t ions 
of t h e Directory show how l i t t l e was r e a l l y known in France 
about the pos i t ion and resources of the French adventurers in 
India. 
'.7hen Decaen was sent out to India in 1803 af te r the 
Treaty of Amiens, h i s ins t ruc t ions included jus t a vague 
suggestion about e s t ab l i sh ing , i n a surrept ious manner, 
contact with the French in India . 
Thus even before the des t ruc t ion of the French forces 
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in the sex-vice of the Indian Princes, it does not appear 
thnt the plans of the French Covernment, regarding India 
at all depended on their cooperation. Nor were the French 
trained forces in the service of the Irdian princes, so 
formidable by any means as was imagined by the India House, 
They were certainly formidable against the indisciplined 
hordes of Pathans and Hajputs but were of no match to the 
English and their trained armies. They had neither the number 
nor the resources required to contest with the English for 
the supremacy in India, They had no cohesion in their ranks, 
on the contrary displayed their weaknesses at the first sign 
of danger. The rapidity with which Perron's army melted away 
in 1805 fit Aligarh, and the pusillanimity with which most of 
the French officers hastened to make terms with the English 
in an effort to secure their private fortunes, shows despite 
the stiff resistance at Laswari, the real nature of the French 
menace. 
The French adventurers were unable to shake the foundation 
of the English power in India. Finally the changes brought about 
during the seven years of Wellesley's leadership were so 
great that they are considered to mark an epoch in the 
development of the British power in India. There was a 
change in political climate and change in emphasis, which 
suited Wellesley, the ardent and enterprising Governor-General 
in India, it was in this favourable atmosphere that 
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Wellesley was able to pursue h i s own policy without apparent 
disharmony with the Home Government. His individual policy 
paid dividends. Consequently, French influence was removed 
from India forever. 
We have seen how in sp i t e of ce r ta in set backs, Napoleon 
did not cease to think about India , which continued to lure 
him. After the b a t t l e of Friedland in 1807, Europe stood 
p ros t r a t e before the mi l i t a ry might of Prance and the foundations 
of Napoleonic Empire in Europe were firmly l a id . At T i l s i t , 
Napoleon made an a l l i ance with t h e Czar in a bid to despatch a 
Franco-Russian expedit ion to India via the Punjab and Sindh, 
lord Minto, the Governor-General took an alarmist view. 
Napoleon's plan encountered r.orious obstacles in i t s way 
before i t could succeed. These hurdles were the t r a d i t i o n a l 
h o s t i l i t y between Russia and P e r s i a , the f luc tua t ing r e l a t i ons 
between Prance and Russia, and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of t ransport 
and communication through land, dissected by dese r t s and 
mountains. 
Lord Minto, the Governor-General in India underscored 
them, in h i s anxiety to safeguard the B r i t i s h possessions 
in India . He was committed to the pol icy of non-intervention 
and the European s i t u a t i o n lef t no scope for any r e a l deviat ion 
from i t . The Peninsular war in Europe, pegged down Napoleon 
and forced him to abandon h i s proposed scheme to expel the 
m 
B r i t i s h from India . Lord Miirto took f u l l advantage of French 
involvement in Peninsular Europe to safeguard h i s northern 
f r o n t i e r s by bringing the two border s t a t e s , viz the Punjab 
and Sindh into the orb i t of the East India Corapary in 1809. 
After signing of the two t r e a t i e s with the two f ront ie r 
s t a t e s , Lord Minto had es tabl ished undisputed ascendancy in 
north India and thus eliminated the French th r ea t to t h e i r 
empire. When war broke out again in Europe,in 1810 between 
Prance S: Russia, apprehensions of a French invasion on India 
seemed impract ica l . England inaugrated the conquest not only 
of French possessions in the Eas t , but even of those countr ies , 
whom Napoleon had forced to toe h i s Continental System. Lord 
Minto could boast tha t the B r i t i s h had nei ther an enemy, nor 
a r i v a l , l e f t from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape Horn. 
* » * * ) f * # * 
Appendix A. 
Biographical Notes on French Off lc ia lB and Adventurere 
.1. Bourquin 
He was a d e s e r t e r from t h e French navy. After a 
chequered c a r e e r , he r o s e t o he a conf idant of Per ron . On 
t h e eve of the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Maratha War, 
he was a t t he Mughal Court t o ma in ta in a French b r i g a d e . 
Defeated by t h e B r i t i s h a t De lh i , he sur rendered t o Lord 
Lake, t he Commander-in-Chief i n 1803. 
2 . De golgne 
He entered the service of Scindhia in 1784. He was 
entrusted with raising two infantry battalions of 850 men 
each, equipped and trained in the European fashion. In 
1790, de Boigne raifiedthree brigades of 15000 regular infantry, 
600 irregulars, 2000 guns and 600 Afghan cavalry. For the 
maintenance of these brigades, a vast area in the Doab, 
consisting of 52 districts and yielding a revenue of 22 lakhs 
of rupees, was assigned to him. He kept his base at Aligarh. 
He returned to Europe in 1795, carrying his amassed wealth 
during his stay in India. 
3 . De Canaple 
He had been a commandant a t Mahe from November, 1787 t o 
A p r i l , 1790. He r e tu rned t o t h e I s l e of France with the 
i n t e n t i o n of r e t u r n i n g t o France , But he was appointed as 
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the commandant of Chandernagore. He died in Calcutta before 
takiiig hie assignment at Chnndernagore. 
4. Dudrenec 
He entered the service of Holkar in 1791. He trained 
the Holkar army on European model. In 1801 driven by the 
h o s t i l i t y of Holkar, he joined the service under Scindhia, 
He was in charge of Ihe fourth and f i f t h Brigades, consist ing 
of 9000 so ld ie rs and 70 guns. On the eve of the second 
Anglo-Maratha war, he follov/ed the example of Perron and 
surrendered to Lord Lake at Agra. 
5. Dupleix 
Joseph Francis Dupleix joined the French East India 
Company in 1720. He made Pondicherry the principal emporium 
of trade in South India. He was defeated by the British 
in 1756 and the French Government recalled him immediately. 
He had dug for France, the foundations of an Empire 
which would, if built upon, have made her the arbiter of 
the East. He died in 1764. 
6. Frimont 
He was the commander of the small French force at 
Chandernagore and was arrested during the Revolutionary 
troubles there. Released from detention, he had gone to 
Delhi to seek employment and was appointed commander of a 
brigade under de Boigne. He died in 1795. 
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7. Montigny 
He was coniTnandaiit a t Chandernagore in 1789. He revived 
French t rade and commerce, effected adminis t ra t ive reforms 
and augmented revenue. But he was d i s l iked by the c i t i zens 
for h i s au tocra t ic behaviour. Subsequently the French Governor-
G-eneral dismissed him, 
8. Pedron 
He v/as the commander of one of the br igades under 
Perron in 1803, He res i s t ed the Br i t i sh army v/ith h i s f u l l 
might a t Aligarh. As a renul t of t h a t , h i s 2000 soldiers 
perished and he was taken a pr isoner a f te r the French 
rout at the hands of Lord Lake. 
9. Perron 
He came to India in 1780 as a common s a i l o r . In 
1789, he was given the command of the second brigade newly 
ra i sed by de Boigne. In 1795 he took over from de Boigne^ who 
returned to Europe. He enjoyed undisputed power for eight 
years . During t h i s period-the B r i t i s h feared him for he 
wanted to e s t ab l i sh the French State in the Doab region. 
Pr io r to outbreak of second Anglo-Maratha war, he deserted 
the Llcindhia and s e t t l ed down at Chandernagore. He l e f t 
for France in 1805. 
Appendix B. 
B r i t i s h Governors-General in India 
1. Lord Gornwallis (1786-93) 
Ke was the f i r s t Governor-General of Ind ia , appointed 
by Parliament. He was a dis t inguished so ld ie r though compelled 
to surrender York Town in the American IVar of Independence. 
During h i s term of of f ice , the p o l i t i c a l sky was one of 
cloudy s t i l l n e s s before the burs t of the French Revolutionary 
cyclone in Europe, He captured Chandernagore, the Chief 
French colony in north India in 1793 following the outbreak 
of Revolutionary disturbances in Europe, He negotiated the 
Treaty of Amiens in 1802. 
2. Sir John Shore (1793-98) 
During h i s t enure , England was a t war with France in 
Europe. Under these circumstances, he stuck to the policy 
of non-intervention in the a f fa i r s of pr incely s t a t e s in 
India , But he was concerned about the per i lous s i t ua t i on 
a r i s ing out of the a c t i v i t i e s of French adventurers under 
the Scindhia, Nizam and Tipu Sultan, Sir Shore was known 
as Baron Teignmouth. 
3 . Lord tVe l i e s ley (1798-1805) 
Perhaps there never was a Governor-General b e t t e r 
informed about Indian Government than the Marq.uess of 
V/ellesley. Since 1793 he had been a member of Board of 
Control. V/Tien he assumed office as Governor-General of India 
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there was uneasiness in London as well as in India over 
the French designs towards India. He was concerned about a 
possible attack on India, due to the exploits of Kapoleon. 
Consequently he devised the subsidiary alliances, aimed at 
expelling the French from Native States, He defeated Scindhia 
at Laswari in 1803 and thus crushed the Maratha supremacy, 
4. Sir Barlow (1805-07) 
The Napoleonic threa t forced him to adopt the policy 
of non-intervention in India. He reduced the company's 
commitments a t a time when they could not be extended or even 
maintained at t h e i r exis t ing l im i t s because England was 
ser ious ly threatened by Napoleon in Europe. 
5 . Lord Minto (1807-13) 
He had much parliamentary experience and was well 
acquainted with Ibdian a f fa i r s before coming to India . He 
followed a middle way betv/een interference and non-interference 
in dealing with Indian s t a t e s . The Napoleonic invasion of Ru*ssia 
in 1812, rendered impossible the revival of the project of a 
Franco-Russian expedition to India . 
6. Lord HastinfTS (1813-23) 
Lord Hastings or Earl of Bloira, a t the age of f i f t y nine, 
came to India. He occupied the exalted office for a decade. 
His p o l i t i c a l sett lement of Central India completed the 
annexationist policy of V/ellesley. As a r e s u l t of tha t , the 
contest v/ith Indian s t a t e s was p r a c t i c a l l y over. 
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Treaty with the Rajah of Lahore, April 25 <, 1809 
Whereas certain differences which had arisen between the 
British Government and the liajah of Lahore have been happily 
and amicably adjusted and both parties being anxious to 
maintain the relations of perfect amity and concord, the 
follov/ing Articles of Treaty which shall be binding on the 
heirs and successors of the two parties have been concluded by 
liajah Hunjeot Singh on his own part and by the af!;ency of 
Cnarles Theophilus Metcalfe, Esquire on the part of the 
British: 
Article 1 
Perpetual friendship shall subsist between the British 
Government and the state of Lahore. The latter shall be 
considered with respect to 1he former, to be on the footing 
of the most favoured powers and the British Government will 
have no concern v/ith the territories and subjects of the 
Hajah to the northward of the River Sutlej. 
Article 2 
The Rajah will never maintain in the territory occupied by him 
and his dependents, on the left bank of the River Sutlej, 
more troops than are necessary for the internal duties of 
that territory, nor commit or suffer any encroachments on the 
possessions or rights of the Chief in its vicinity. 
Article 3 
In the event of a violation of any of the preceding articles 
or of a departure from the rules of friendship on the part 
of either state, this Treaty shall be considered to be null 
and void. 
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This Trea ty c o n s i s t i n g of four A r t i c l e s , having "been 
s e t t l e d and concluded a t Amri t sar on 25th day of Ariri l , 
1809. 
Seal and s i g n a t u r e of Seal and s i g n a t u r e of 
C.T. IffiTCALPE RAJAH RUNJEET SINGH 
(£d) MIKT?0 
R a t i f i e d by the Governor -Genera l - in -Counci l , on 30th May,1809. 
A i t c h i s o n , C.U., A c o l l e c t i o n of T r e a t i e s , Engagements and Sanads 
Vol V I I I , 1909. 
Text of the Treaty of Hyderabad 
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Trea ty vgth t h e Amirs of Sindh, August 22 , 1809 
A r t i c l e 1 
There shall be eternal friendship between the British Government 
and that of Eindh, namely Mir Ghulam Ali, Mir Karim Ali and 
Mir I.Iurad Ali. 
Article 2 
Enmity s h a l l never appear between the two s t a t e s . 
A r t i c l e 3 
The mutual despa tch of the V a k i l s of bo th Governments namely 
t h e B r i t i s h Government and Sindhian Government s h a l l always 
con t inue . 
A r t i c l e 4 
The GoveriMent of Sindh w i l l not a l low the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of 
the t r i b e of the French in Sindh. 
V/ri t ten on 10th of the month of Rujeeb-ool-Moorujub i n t h e year 
of the Hegi ra 1224» corresponding with 22nd of August 1809. 
(sd) MINTO 
R a t i f i e d by t h e Right Honourable the Governor-General a t 
P o r t St . George, l 5 t h November 1809. 
(sd) N. B. EDMOFSTONE 
Secretary 
Ai tch ipon ,C .U. , A c o l l e c t i o n of T r e a t i e s , Engagements and Sanads 
Vol VI I , 1909. 
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